DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 207 873 SO 013 406

AUTHOR Schneider, Mark
TITLE Ethnicity and Politics. IRSS Research Reports.
INSTITUTION North Carolina Univ., Chapel Hill. Inst. for Research in Social Science.
REPORT NO ISBN-0-89143-006-7
PUB DATE 79
NOTE 96p.
AVAILABLE FROM Institute for Research in Social Science, Manning Hall 026A, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC 27514 ($5.00).

EDRS PRICE MF01 Plus Postage. PC Not Available from EDRS.
DESCRIPTORS Ethnic Bias; *Ethnicity; *Political Attitudes; *Politics; Racial Factors; Religious Factors; *Social Science Research

ABSTRACT

This research report examines the role of ethnicity in politics. The concept of ethnicity encompasses at least four distinct dimensions: nationality identification, religious identification, old vs. new ethnic stock, and racial membership. In the national sample analyzed, several interesting patterns of ethnic differentiation emerged. First, none of the dimensions of ethnicity was found to be very strongly related to political behavior. In general, religious identification had comparatively the strongest and most consistent impact on the partisan behavior and the issue attitudes of whites. It was then argued that these generally weak relationships might be strengthened once controls for education ("class") and size of place of residence were instituted. Once these relevant controls were introduced, the impact of ethnicity on the political behavior of individuals in each of the control categories did increase over that found in the national sample as a whole. However, there was no uniform decrease in the importance of ethnicity on the behavior of individuals with higher education or individuals outside the central cities. The paper points out the importance of politics between regions in the country. Subsectioning the nation into smaller regions may in the long run be the most productive strategy for further study of ethnic politics. (Author/RM)

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ETHNICITY AND POLITICS

MARK SCHNEIDER

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University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
1979

SO 013 406

International Standard Book Number: 0-89143-006-7
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 79-504

Institute for Research in Social Science
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

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Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Schneider, Mark, 1946-
Ethnicity and Politics.

(IRSS research reports)
Bibliography: p.
1. Minorities--United States--Political activity.
2. United States--Politics and government--
3. Ethnicity. I. Title. II. Series: University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Institute for Research in Social Science.. IRSS research reports.
E184.A1S33 322.4 79-504
ISBN 0-89143-006-7

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CHAPTER 1

The Rise of White Ethnicity in the 1960s

In recent years, ethnicity based on European national origin has received an extraordinary amount of media and academic attention as a form of social identification useful in explaining political attitudes, behavior, and organization. Yet in a way, the concern expressed for this type of ethnic differentiation seems to contradict the common sense perception that nationality-based ethnicity must be declining in importance. More than 50 years have passed since the effective termination of European migration to the United States. This 50-year time period would seem to imply that the generation for whom extra-American national origin was truly and personally experienced is passing from the scene. Even second generation ethnics from the most recent immigration are similarly aging, and the progeny of the earlier waves of migration are into the third, fourth, and fifth generation or more. Thus the new concern for national origin comes at a time when the vast majority of Americans can claim only the United States as their birthplace, the birthplace of their parents, and indeed of their grandparents. On this ground alone, the recent emphasis on nationality-based ethnicity seems incongruous.

When this generational process is coupled with the break-up of tight, contiguous ethnic communities through social and occupational mobility, we might reasonably expect that nationality-based ethnicity would be further weakened. Increasing levels of education might also be expected to work against nationality identification as a relevant form of social identification.

These and other social processes have been at work, all acting to undermine the importance of nationality-based ethnic identification. Further, the ideology of the melting pot has traditionally been the dominant response to the diverse national origins of America's population. Its predominance as a norm has made the use of nationality-based ethnicity less than fully legitimate as a basis of political organization.

Yet in the 1960s and early 1970s, nationality-based ethnicity has experienced a kind of renaissance in its

perceived importance. Cries of "Irish Power" or "Italian Power" have been heard in the major cities of the country. The concept of decentralization of city government, while primarily a response to the demands of a racial ethnic group (blacks), has been expanded to include white nationality groups. Federal legislation has called for the establishment of centers for the study of ethnicity. Interpretations of voting behavior expressed in nationality terms are widely read and given substantial credence. And perhaps most telling as a measure of popular response is the media production of highly successful films and television series exploiting nationality-based ethnicity.

Something illogical is occurring. Nationality is being accorded a degree of attention not known since the turn of the century when the melding of large numbers of immigrants into American society was a palpably real problem. Yet no such problem existed in the United States in the 1960s, which raises the question of why the concern for nationality ethnicity now.

I. ETHNIC ENCLAVES AS THE BASIS FOR ETHNIC POLITICS

This concern for nationality-based politics comes at a time when the very base of nationality politics, contiguous ethnically-defined neighborhoods, is being destroyed by increasing levels of education, social mobility, urban renewal, and highway construction. That these *original* ethnic enclaves in the cities of the Northeast and Midwest regulated the behavior of their inhabitants cannot really be doubted. Arriving immigrants, faced with a strange and often hostile society, sought areas where people similar to themselves could help to mitigate the harshness of the environment. Ethnic residential segregation became common as a form of social adaptation (Lieberson, 1963:5) and was quite important in the early 1900s. However, throughout this century, the degree of white ethnic segregation has been decreasing. Lieberson's study confirms that in the forty-year period between 1910 and 1950, residential segregation of ten white ethnic groups steadily decreased (p. 14).

The very nature of large-scale immigration to the United States helped to create ethnic consciousness:

> these [immigrants'] village or regional groupings, based especially on family and kinship relationships, in their turn sought protection and some power against the strange world in which they found themselves by banding together, one with another. So that for many groups . . . nationality became a relevant factor only when the necessities of adjusting to American experience forced the village and regional groups to band together (Greeley, 1971:38).

This adaptive mechanism created in large degree what Gans describes as an "urban village" (Gans, 1962). The degree to which ethnicity in an urban village can determine behavior, even thirty years after its creation, can be seen in Gans' description of "peer group society." Behavior among members of the urban village is regulated by the peer group, but more important for our purposes, the peer group also defines a member's relations with the "outside" world. The community in the West End (an urban village in Boston) consisted of "institutions--predominantly Italian--that existed outside of the peer group society but were linked with it if and when they could be used to meet group and individual needs" (Gans, 1962:105). The success of these community institutions--the civic and social organizations, parochial schools, churches, some businesses--depended on how well they served the peer group society.

The West Enders use these community services but face the non-Italian "outside world" as infrequently as possible (Gans, 1962:106). Furthermore, the West Enders

> become most suspicious of, and hostile toward, the outside world when they must deal with government and the law. Most West Enders are convinced that the police, the government bureaucracy, the elected officials and the courts are corrupt and engaged in a neverending conspiracy to deprive the citizens of what is morally theirs (p. 163).

Thus political orientations and attitudes are defined and reinforced by the urban village. Since urban villages are delimited by nationality boundaries, we would expect different kinds of political behavior to be found in different

ethnic groups. It is interesting to note that the kinds of behavior and orientations that Gans describes as existing in the West End are similar to those found by Almond and Verba (1963) in their study of Italy included in *The Civic Culture*. While it is often argued that the nature of life in the urban village was a reaction to the immigrant experience in urban America, these similarities between the Italians of the West End and those of their native country give some support to an alternative argument: that the various immigrant groups that came to the United States in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are characterized by a distinct orientation or ethos that distinguishes them from the American "core culture." (One must note, however, that Almond and Verba's study was done in the late 1950s; one might hesitate to argue that the same orientation existed in the 1880s and 1890s when heavy Italian immigration began, or in the 1910s when it ended.) Nevertheless, Gans' findings indicated that ethnic enclaves to a large degree controlled the political orientations and behavior of their members. This process existed despite the ideology of assimilation and the melting pot that held such activity to be un-American.

That this control function is not peculiar to the West End can be seen in other works describing nationality-based ghettoes. In a study of the Addams area of Chicago, Suttles (1968) finds a pattern similar to that described by Gans in Boston. Although the Addams area as a whole was ethnically mixed, it consisted of distinct sub-units which were ethnically homogeneous. The residents of these ethnic enclaves had a well-defined sense of spatial location in which they fit themselves, and saw others as similarly pegged within bounded areas. Suttles (1968:Chap. 2) refers to this as "ordered segmentation." Inter-ethnic relationships were discouraged and were viewed as threatening the conventional behavior of the individual's ethnic group (p. 62). Thus ethnic groups had a strong hold on their members--a hold that helped to define one's relationship with the world.

Jane Jacobs' study, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, gives further support to this line of argument. While Jacobs stresses the fact that social interactions in the three neighborhoods she studied occurred because of the physical layout of the neighborhoods, *i.e.*, short blocks, small stores, wide sidewalks, the point constantly overlooked is that all three neighborhoods were ethnic enclaves. One might argue then, that all the friendly interactions she perceives

and praises were as much the result of the urban village-peer group society nature of ethnic enclaves, as of the physical layout of the neighborhood.

Other evidence in the same vein can be found in a study of Montreal by Breton (1970). Breton notes that as new immigrants enter the city, the passage of time *increases* the lines of communication *within* the ethnic community and *decreases* the extent of contact with the native population. The development of ethnic enclaves over time and the substitution of ethnically similar social contacts for those with the native population would seem to indicate that fellow ethnics would, to a large degree, define one's social world. Wolfinger (1965) offers additional support for this line of thinking.

In short, we would seem to be presented with a strong argument that ethnic groups characterized by spatial concentration have a significant effect on the behavior of their members. In this sense, nationality-based politics would seem a logical strategy, but this is where the recent emphasis on ethnicity seems to contradict common sense. To wit: the argument presented above appears to depend on the quality of spatial concentration. Yet the great mobility of the American population, high rates of intermarriage across nationality lines, suburbanization, and increasing levels of education all appear to be forces which would lessen nationality groups' spatial concentration. (Note that the West End was destroyed by urban renewal soon after Gans completed his work; the Addams area of Chicago was scheduled for urban renewal and was being encroached upon by the University of Illinois; and Greenwich Village, one of the three neighborhoods Jacobs studied, has been undergoing extensive renovation to accommodate middle class and ethnically heterogeneous whites who, by moving in, have displaced Italian residents who cannot afford the rising rents.) Given these events, one would logically expect to see a total absence of concern for nationality-based politics; yet the opposite has in fact occurred. For an explanation of this turn of events, we will examine the rise of nationality-based ethnic identification in terms of a social protest movement of "middle-Americans" against the social conditions of the 1960s.

II. NATIONALITY POLITICS AS A PROTEST MOVEMENT

In particular, the rise in nationality group activity can be seen as a reaction to the socioeconomic "revolution" of American blacks during the 1960s. Scammon and Wattenberg (1970:39) have found that "suddenly, sometime in the 1960s, 'crime' and 'race' and 'lawlessness' and 'civil rights' became the most important domestic issues in America" and, more importantly, became intricately interwoven in the minds of the American people. While, as we shall see later, certain temporal sequences were pointing to a perhaps inevitable rise in nationality group consciousness (in spite of the break-up of contiguous ethnic communities), the importance of these components of the "Social Issue" helped create the atmosphere and the style in which nationality-based politics re-emerged as highly important. This can be seen immediately in the fact that cries of "Irish Power" or "Italian Power" were not heard until "Black Power" was already a highly vocal demand of, and form of political organization for, American blacks. The positive government response and significant amount of media coverage given to the increased demands of blacks organized under that rubric acted as a spur to other ethnic groups to organize in order to present their own sets of demands and to protect the positions they had secured for themselves.

This is not to say that concern for satisfying ethnic group demands for recognition and access to resources had not previously been an important political phenomenon in major American cities. Rather, that for various reasons the allocation of rewards to nationality groups was carried out in more *sub rosa* fashion in the decades immediately preceding the 1960s. In those years the political systems of the cities were able to operate without explicit appeals to nationality groups for several reasons. First, European immigration had been effectively terminated in the 1920s (though to be sure internal migration in the United States still occurred). This end to immigration had decreased the need for the political systems of the cities to face the demands of new nationality-based ethnic groups. Thus in the 30-year period between the 1920s and the 1950s, the tendency to organize explicitly along ethnic lines decreased as alignments and rewards became formalized between the ethnic groups already within a city. This became increasingly the case in the 1940s and 1950s. The *status quo* between ethnic groups was more or less satisfactory, changes were usually incremental, and the need to

rely on ethnic group identification as a political strategy was subsequently reduced.

Second, the use of nationality as a legitimate focus of political activity was repudiated by the acceptance on the part of the political elite and the political culture in general of the ideology of assimilation and its variant, the "melting pot." These ideologies render explicit appeals to nationality "un-American." In addition, these cultural responses were supported by the dominant intellectual mood of the social sciences in the late 1950s and early 1960s (the "end of ideology"),[1] stressing the non-conflictual nature of American society and its ability to meet the demands placed upon it.

To see how the "end of ideology" position reinforced the neglect of nationality group identification, we need only look at Dahl's work *Who Governs?* (1961), in particular the section entitled the "Ex Plebes." Dahl describes three developmental stages through which ethnic groups evolve as they become politically assimilated. In Stage 1, the ethnic group has only recently arrived in the United States, is socioeconomically homogeneous, and its members are concentrated at the bottom of the status hierarchy (as "proletarians" or "plebes"). According to Dahl, as time passes, the ethnic group enters Stage 2 where it becomes more heterogeneous. In this second stage, appeals to the group's ethnic identity can still be highly effective. However, in Stage 3 such appeals to ethnicity are fruitless and ethnicity is replaced by socioeconomic class identification as the crucial variable. With this psychological change on the part of the ex-plebes, political campaign strategy shifts from the use of purely ethnic appeals to the use of more effective appeals for the "correct" solutions to technological problems.

Thus, according to Dahl's schema, appeals to the ethnic identity of any "advanced" group, *i.e.*, any group at Stage 3, would fail, a point made by others who postulate "assimilation." But where Dahl differs from other "assimilationists" and where he reflects the "end of ideology" school of thought is in the causal sequence that he hypothesizes. While most sociologists would argue that assimilation is a social process caused by the breakdown of the ethnic group through spatial and economic mobility, Dahl attributes far greater importance to the nature of the issues of the fifties as responsible for the dilution of ethnicity's appeal. According to Dahl, the issues of that decade led to an emphasis on the "collective

rewards" of policy rather than on the "divisible rewards" upon which ethnic politics (or synonomously, the "politics of recognition") rest. The maturity of New Deal welfare issues and their replacement by more technical issues such as urban renewal, redevelopment, and transportation had, in Dahl's view, undermined the grounds for a politics based on ethnic cleavages.

Supporting this intellectual position was an historical tendency to denigrate America's ethnic diversity. Gordon (1964) finds that three central ideologies have served as cultural responses to diversity in ethnic backgrounds: Anglo-Conformity (and its concomitant, assimilation); the melting pot; and cultural pluralism. Gordon argues that Anglo-Conformity and the melting pot have been the most common "ideological" responses to ethnicity; both discredit the use of nationality in societal affairs.

Anglo-Conformity, for example, precludes nationality-based politics through its implicit assumption of the acceptance of the culture of white Anglo-Saxon Protestants as the "superior" "core" culture of American society and the model to which all ethnic groups should conform. This reaction to ethnicity, according to Gordon, has been "in its more moderate forms, however explicit its formulation, the most prevalent ideology of assimilation in America throughout the nation's history.... Suspicion of those who were 'foreigners' either through religion or national background, or both, was not uncommon" (p. 89).

Central to this concept of Anglo-Conformity as an ideology is the notion of "structural" assimilation. It was envisioned by its adherents that with the success of Anglo-Conformity, the various ethnic groups would lose all forms of structural and cultural distinctness and "disappear" as social entities. It is obvious that the prevalence of this attitude toward ethnicity has discouraged full-fledged use of the ethnic form of social identification in politics and societal affairs in general.

The second assimilation ideology distinguished by Gordon is the theory of the "melting pot." The image of the "melting pot" resembles that of Anglo-Conformity in that the distinctness of ethnic groups was seen as not desirable, and as a result, American society should and would function in such a way that differences between groups would be "melted" down. This

ideology differed from that of Anglo-Conformity in that its adherents did not demand conformity to a WASP core-culture; rather, they envisioned the creation of an American society through a process of give-and-take between the various ethnic groups. Over the long run it was envisioned, and indeed hoped, that all ethnic groups would lose their distinctness as they helped to create a new American society. As was the case with Anglo-Conformity, this ideology discourages the use of nationality-based politics. Thus these two responses, the dominant ones in American history, can be seen as a cause of the *sub rosa* atmosphere that characterized nationality-based politics until the 1960s.

The third ideological response to cultural diversity, "cultural pluralism," allows for the explicit recognition of nationality differences, and emphasizes the benefits of a heterogeneous culture. Ethnic politics would have their highest degree of legitimacy in a society accepting this ideology. However, cultural pluralism has been generally submerged by the other two ideologies described above. Thus we can see that strong intellectual and social forces were at work in the pre-1960 period to limit the role of national origins in societal affairs.

Finally, one can view World War II as a significant factor in the dilution of ethnic consciousness. The war itself inevitably marked a lessening of domestic conflict as the nation turned its energy and concentration abroad and sent its young men out of domestic battlegrounds onto foreign ones. Furthermore, the intensity of the struggle and the demands that it made upon the population to unify discouraged the divisiveness that can be associated with nationality-based politics. For the countless millions of Americans who came of age during the war, the experiences of wartime America must have acted to inhibit the growth of ethnic consciousness. Finally, as we shall discuss later, the war also had an adverse effect on the ethnic consciousness of certain important white ethnic groups.

III. THE POLITICS OF WELFARE AND ETHNIC POLITICS

While the above processes created an atmosphere in which the translation of nationality group identification into open political activity was hindered and the legitimacy of this form of identification questioned, certain counterprocesses

were at work to undermine the quiescence of the 1950s and to prove that the New Deal had not resolved the problems of American society. Indeed, Piven and Cloward (1971) have gone so far as to state that the period between the 1930s and the 1960s marks a cycle in the politics of the distribution of welfare. One does not have to accept the argument that welfare politics operate in cyclical fashion to notice that the period of the early to mid-1960s saw an enormous increase in the number of welfare recipients and the number and cost of welfare programs, and that this increased activity reversed the trend of the 1950s toward reduction of welfare expenditures. Let us, however, accept Piven and Cloward's concept of a cyclical process for the moment. They argue that the period of the 1950s was not a time of maturation for the political system but only a stage in the cycle of politics. The 1960s marked the entrance of the United States into the next stage of the cycle: the quiescence of the 1950s (itself a result of concessions granted the poor in the 1930s) allowed the political system to withdraw concessions earlier given to the poor. Consequently, the 1960s were initially characterized by a neglect of the poor, producing a concomitant rise in their discontent. In the Northern and Western cities to which the poor (primarily blacks displaced by the changes in the agricultural system of the South) were migrating, the political elites did not respond to resulting demands. Pressures built up to a point where a large-scale response by the federal government became necessary (Piven and Cloward, 1971: Chaps. 8,9).

While Piven and Cloward believe that the stimulus that caused the Great Society response to the welfare crises and to the conditions of the inner city was inherent in the cyclical process of American politics, one need not accept that assumption to recognize the validity of their analysis of the Great Society's programs and the disruption it engendered. They argue that the response of the Great Society was to mobilize the poor (again mostly, or rather most visibly, the black poor) against the local relief agencies. This pressure followed three main lines of attack:

1. offering the poor information and assistance in getting relief;

2. challenging a host of local laws that kept people off the welfare rolls; and,

3. mobilization of the poor through participation and sponsoring community groups (p. 250).

Each one of these strategies increased the level of conflict within the cities by attacking the prevailing distribution of services. Piven and Cloward note that these programs dealt not with poverty *per se* but with the conditions of the 'inner city'; they bypassed established state and municipal agencies and were indeed implicitly critical of local agencies and services. The new poverty programs built political machine-like support among blacks much in the traditional manner of offering jobs and services to build organizational loyalty. Along with the goal of developing local client organizations was the desire of the Great Society to make sure that funds actually reached the blacks by circumventing a state and local political apparatus that was frequently anti-black (Piven and Cloward, 1971:260-61).

By direct intervention in the ghetto and by making blacks more demanding, the federal government disturbed the traditional distribution of services that city government had maintained. Because services are the essence of urban government, the whole structure of urban politics and ethnic group arrangements was shaken (p. 263).

The Community Action Program and Federal Intervention

Thus the choice of a Community Action Program (CAP) and a "War on Poverty" as the overall strategy for fighting poverty was a crucial event in creating the rise in nationality-based politics. An examination of the logic of the CAP will indicate this connection. The CAP had as its predecessors the Ford Foundation's Gray Areas Program and the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency, with the latter the stronger influence (Marris and Rein, 1967:130, *et passim;* Moynihan, 1969). Both sources were heavily committed to the use of planning and evaluative research for all programs they intended to fund. Furthermore, they were committed to the application of sociological theory; in particular, the theory espoused by Cloward and Ohlin, both of the Columbia School of Social Work, that the causes of poverty were traceable to blockages in the opportunity structures of the poor--that is, the poor wanted to succeed but did not have the proper training to take advantage of the opportunities that existed (Marris and Rein, 1967: 19-20; Cloward and Ohlin, 1960). Thus the ideal course of action would include training programs and social "remediation" to help the poor to overcome their shortcomings and deficiencies so that they could fit into society. The emphasis was

to be on the young, *e.g.*, Headstart, job training, dropout prevention, because they were perceived to be the most malleable group. The young comprised the major target population; the goal was to make them conform to the norms of society and thus to enable them to share in the affluence of America.

Participation was also a crucial aspect of both the President's Committee and the Ford Foundation's conceptual approach (as can be seen in Mobilization for Youth--the program to which the most time and energy were devoted and which acted as the prototype in many ways for the later Community Action Agencies). Participation was valued not only because it was a norm believed in by these elite representatives of a democratic society, but also because it was seen as a way of giving the poor a greater stake in society. Furthermore, participation was to act as a grooming device to prepare the poor for other social situations that they would encounter as opportunity structures opened up.

This formulation is immensely optimistic in its assumption of the existence of opportunities and its benevolent concept of the pathology (or rather non-pathology) of poverty. Both the assumption and the concept are questionable. The concept of blocked opportunity structures assumes that society has actual need of the poor and the under- and unemployed to fill jobs and opportunities that cannot be filled by the current labor pool. This supposition has been questioned by many analysts (Wellman; Cohn; Bluestone in Gordon, 1971; Rein, 1970) who claim that the American economy has no job opportunities for the poor.

Further, the theory of blocked opportunity structures also affords an optimistic view of the psychology of the poor. It assumes that the poor do indeed have the motivation to succeed but that this drive has somehow been thwarted (and not thwarted by malevolent social forces). Therefore, intensive social services directed at developing skills and habits that conform to general societal norms will be quickly adopted and the poor can rapidly begin to succeed. The possibility that poverty may be caused by much deeper psychological conditions was rejected almost *a priori*. However, is it not just as possible that Banfield's (1970) view of the poor as people with a deviant psychology (and one almost impossible to change in a short time) is correct? The major point to be made is that the theory under which the War on Poverty operated assumed that rapid changes and achievements would be possible--an assumption for which no proof existed.

The basic rubric under which all the anti-poverty activity took place, the War on Poverty, indicates the nature of another assumption of the welfare programs of the Great Society. Poverty was the enemy--an enemy against which all could unite. The assumption implied was that there existed no basic conflict of interest between the poor, on the one hand, and on the other the bureaucratic structures (mainly in the cities but also those of the federal government), elected officials, the more affluent population of the cities, and the society as a whole (Rein, 1970:158-60). Hence, mobilizing the poor to increase their demands on bureaucratic and political structures would not be met by resistance on the part of officials and bureaucrats.

Despite the possibilities for error, these very challengeable assumptions were embodied in the logic of the Community Action Program. The idea of increased activity aimed at breaking down obstructions to the opportunity structures of the poor was the conceptual underpinning for the Community Action Program. In the rapid expansion of the CAP in the 1964-1965 period, the nature of the program was changed in some subtle ways. These changes, which led to what Moynihan (1969) has called a "maximum feasible misunderstanding," clouded the atmosphere and produced unnecessary and complicating hostilities. However, the very logic of the program that the federal government would fund a new set of groups with the avowed purpose of escalating demands on government structures (federal, state, and local), and that these demands would not alienate important decision-makers and power groups in society, would alone have been sufficient to lead to the program's failure.[2] Furthermore, when the inevitable did in fact occur, the local CAP organizations were exposed as powerless organizations, having no resources to fall back upon, and thus no protection for themselves.

The reason for this lack of independent resources again can be traced to the theory of blocked opportunity structures. This theory, as noted above, implied that no groups in society were in opposition to increasing the opportunities available to the poor and that the most successful strategy to overcome these blocks was to change the poor by making remedial services available to them. Direct income redistribution through tax policy or income supplements was not seen as necessary--instead, redistribution through services was viewed as more beneficial. As a result, the CAP and the poor would not obtain control over monetary resources of their own; rather,

they would be the recipients of bureaucratic guidance and services.

Several of the most evident results of the War on Poverty can be connected with the following sequence of events: 1) An enormous growth in the welfare service bureaucracy occurred in the 1960s. In a way, this process did help the urban poor and blacks by providing a rapidly growing arena of employment which had not been saturated by whites and in which the poor and blacks could find jobs. 2) The failure of the program to help the poor develop independent resources further strengthened the power of bureaucrats as increased funds and expanded spheres of interest rested in their hands. Krause (1968), for example, argues that the citizen participation concept was utilized by bureaucrats as an implement to expand the range of bureaucratic activities perceived to be legitimate. 3) "Symbolic" rewards were dispensed to the poor as the poor (again, mostly poor blacks) were given media coverage and governmental attention; 4) There was a rise in expectations on the part of the poor that something was really going to change. 5) As these expectations were not met and demands continued rising, the lower and working class ethnic whites of the cities began to feel threatened and pressured. This situation helped to create increased levels of activity on the part of nationality groups. "When class conflict is induced in an American urban community it would seem to have a natural tendency to assert itself in terms of ethnic conflict as well" (Moynihan, 1969:114; Novak, 1972).

Litt gives further support for this line of argument in his assertion that the introduction of these federal programs into the urban area expanded the arena on conflict beyond the accommodation model[3] that white ethnics felt had served them so well (Litt, 1970:102-09). Thus the political style of white ethnics was challenged by the programs of the Great Society. Since blacks do not share the particular norms and attachments to society held by white ethnics, conflicts between blacks and ethnic whites would have been inevitable in any case, Litt feels. However, the expansion of welfare politics in their new form, and the induced conflict that resulted increased the level of threat perceived by white ethnics. This heightened conflict between poor blacks and lower-class white ethnics helped to create the conditions for the renaissance of nationality politics.

Lane gives other indications of the process by which the increased level of conflict found expression in nationality-

based politics. In his chapter "The Way of the Ethnics in Politics," Lane (1969) mentions three general points, or rules, that are relevant to this process.

1. "The greater the ethnic conflict in a community... the greater the rates of participation of the conflicting groups" (p. 94). The breakdown of existing models of accommodation in the 1960s through Great Society welfare programs led to increased ethnic conflict. This conflict increased the level of participation of the ethnic groups which were being threatened. Finally, this increased level of participation made ethnicity more visible and more salient as a determinant of political behavior--a kind of self-feeding process.

2. "The less impartial and 'bureaucratized' the administration of justice and services, the more ethnic (and other socially identifiable groups) will be drawn into politics" (Lane, 1969:94). The Great Society welfare programs were aimed at blacks and hence were "particular" (not universal) in their administration and impact. They violated "bureaucratic-technical" norms of administration (negating thereby the assumptions of the "end of ideology" position), and the issues of the 1960s were marked by "divisible" rather than "collective" rewards.

3. "The more self-conscious and status-conscious an ethnic group, the more the members of that group will be sensitive to the politics of 'recognition,' *i.e.*, appointment to office and political candidacy of fellow ethnics" (Lane, 1969:95). As blacks became more self-conscious and demanded recognition, they disturbed existing strongholds of ethnic groups (*e.g.*, the Ocean Hill/Brownsville school decentralization dispute in New York in 1968 can be viewed to a large degree as blacks demanding increased "recognition" in a system that has "traditionally" been controlled by Jews). This in turn activated other ethnic groups to protect those positions that they deemed "belonged" to them. The collective arrangements between ethnic groups that constituted the *status quo* were challenged and ethnic group conflict re-emerged.

Thus the black revolution of the 1960s and the correspondence of that revolution with a significantly enlarged and disruptive federal government presence in the cities disturbed the balance between ethnic groups that had made ethnicity less visible in the thirty years preceding the 1960s. It was the threat by blacks to the existing order that helped to elevate

ethnicity to its higher level of importance and subsequently challenged the dominance of the ideology of Anglo-Conformity. In reality then, "Italian Power," "Irish Power," *etc.* have not been so much an imitation of the success of "Black Power" as a reaction to the threats that it represents.

IV. CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN THE 1960s AND THE RISE OF ETHNIC POLITICS

A second trend, a challenge to the dominant ideologies of the melting pot and assimilation, reinforced this growth of nationality-based politics. Two major sources challenging the norms of cultural homogeneity emerged in the 1960s. First was the growth of a highly visible and distinctive black culture that had no apparent desire to adopt the behavior patterns of the dominant white society. Black hairstyles, clothing styles, language styles, manners of social interaction, etc., became part of the scene and indeed, were adopted by many whites. Thus blacks, never well assimilated into white society, began to exalt their peripheral position. The acceptance of open manifestations of blackness by white society signalled a severe challenge to the norm of Anglo-Conformity. Moreover, the notion of homogeneity of culture was not rejected by blacks alone. The 1960s saw a significant youth movement, the "counterculture," that also rejected the norms of cultural conformity. The spread of the divergent life styles of the counterculture to the general culture further challenged the dominant norm of cultural assimilation.

A two-fold process resulted; first the life styles of the black and youth countercultures became part of the "social issue" that created a sense of malaise in American society, particularly among the white lower class, *i.e.*, ethnic whites. But the existence and acceptance of these divergent cultures and the concomitant tolerance of cultural diversity applied to other groups in society, including ethnic whites, and allowed ethnics to reassert their own nationality differences as a protest against the activities of these other subcultures. Thus the 1960s witnessed a strong attack on the dominant ideology that had previously de-legitimized the use of nationality politics, an attack reflected in, and supported by, intellectuals who began to stress the "unmeltability" of ethnics. These cultural changes endorsed the ideology of "cultural pluralism," thereby presaging the replacement of Anglo-Conformity and the "melting pot."

In short, the process described above can be stated in the following terms: lower-class white ethnics became increasingly disturbed by the threats they perceived to be emanating from blacks and to a lesser extent, from white youths of the counterculture. At the same time that they were feeling threatened by these groups, the cultural diversity that these groups were arguing for became acceptable in American society. This allowed ethnics to react to the perceived threats by emphasizing their own nationality identification as a strategy for protecting their positions in society.

This type of conflict as reaction to perceived threats is not unusual in American history. Oscar Handlin, for example, stresses it as an historical theme:

> conflicts appeared...as the result of efforts to introduce rigidity into the system, most often when one group sought preeminence and to impose its own standards upon others. Nativism, for example, was not simply a battle of 'Americans' against immigrants. It was, rather, the effort of particular ethnic groups, whose position was challenged by events over which they had no control, to maintain their earlier dominance under a fixed conception of Americanism (Handlin, 1969:17).

V. THE CYCLE OF ETHNIC POLITICS

Let us now return to Piven and Cloward's concept of the cyclical process of welfare politics and, using the information developed above, reformulate it in a manner more relevant to our concern for the rise of nationality-based politics in recent years. We should note that Piven and Cloward do not limit the time span with which they are concerned (they seem to imply that the process they envision has existed in the past and will exist into the indefinite future). We, however, will deal only with the period between the 1930s and the 1970s. Handlin (1951) and Lubell (1965) both argue that the 1930s were marked by severe ethnic conflict in the cities of the United States as ethnic groups fought to preserve whatever they had achieved and to reach accommodations with other ethnic groups. The severe economic conditions of the Depression created a "zero-sum" psychology that heightened

the necessity and level of conflict. Furthermore, the designers of the New Deal were actively engaged in the creation of a labor policy that, in effect, heightened ethnic conflict by organizing groups of workers against their employers, since these workers were to a large extent "newer" immigrants as opposed to their employers, who issued from more established stocks of Americans. Thus the tension existed throughout the 1930s and only abated with the economic buildup and the psychological changes related to defense expenditures and preparations for World War II.

As we noted above, the war itself inevitably marked a lessening of domestic conflict as the society turned its attention and energy outwards. The end of the war did not bring depression and poor economic conditions; on the contrary, the immediate postwar years saw a virtual growth explosion and a rapid expansion of living areas via suburbanization. This process relieved ethnic pressures in the cities, created a euphoric feeling among mobile whites, and perhaps actually did create, at least temporarily, the conditions reflected in the "end of ideology" works cited above. In light of the argument presented by Piven and Cloward, one can see that not only did the welfare reforms and concessions to the poor in the 1930s quiet the militancy of the poor, but expanding housing and economic conditions in the 1940s and 1950s quieted lower-middle-class ethnic whites. These two trends combined to produce a "non-zero sum" psychology and a resultant politics that was less divisive.

And yet, as we have discussed, forces were at work to undermine the prevailing quiescence. First, the concessions given to the poor in the 1930s were being cut back. In addition, the revolution in Southern agriculture was accelerating the flow of blacks to the cities of the West and North. This internal migration, coupled with rising levels of immigration of Spanish-speaking peoples (Chicanos and Puerto Ricans) into the cities, began to generate new urban pressures. As long as suburbanization could act as an escape valve, the pressure was tolerable. Although suburbanization did in fact continue in the 1960s, it was no longer as easy or as gratifying an experience as it was perceived to be in the 1950s.

The 1960s saw demands for the integration of city and suburban school systems as well as demands by city and federal officials for an end to the privileged status of the suburbs as sanctuaries. Further demands of a redistributive nature

were presented to whites as a result of the Civil Rights movement, the Great Society's Community Action Program, and the urban riots of the mid-60s which aroused fear of a continuous chain of "long, hot summers." These redistributive demands increased the level of conflict over that found in the 1950s. (This view is supported by Lowi [1964] who argues that redistributive demands always produce more conflict than distributive or regulatory politics--the types of political issues identified by the end of ideology argument as typical of the 1950s.)

The translation of this increased conflict into ethnic terms can now be restated. First of all, the futility of the flight to the suburbs caused white ethnic groups to go on the defensive in a way reminiscent of the "politics of revenge" (see Litt, 1970: Chaps. 3 and 4). Basic to this concept is the idea that as older ethnic groups find avenues of endeavor and advancement they become willing to allocate the lesser rewards they have been obtaining through control of government and political service to newer ethnic groups for whom these rewards signify an advance. The politics of revenge comes into play when the older groups do not advance but instead cling to their benefits, preferments, and recognitions in the face of demands from newer ethnic groups. Growth in the 1950s made the politics of revenge unnecessary because the older ethnic groups had an escape, i.e., to the suburbs. The recognition in the 1960s of the futility of suburbanization plus the rapidly rising level of perceived threats made the politics of revenge more prevalent by imposing limits on the ability of older ethnic groups to move upward and outward. This reintroduced the rigidity that Handlin finds historically associated with increased levels of ethnic conflict. Thus we find older ethnic groups trying to introduce rigidity into the system because they feel cornered by the rising demands of new black and Spanish-speaking immigrants (as well as by increased threats presented by the counterculture).

Thus while these rising demands by the newest immigrant groups may be translated most explicitly into "ethnic" conflict along racial lines, the disturbances in the "traditional" arrangement among white ethnic groups have also created a revival in the power of these groups, as individuals seek out "landsmen" for protection and reassurance.

VI. THE TEMPORAL BASE OF ETHNIC POLITICS IN THE 1960s

Ethnic conflict reasserted itself in the 1960s as a protective device against demands by the ethnic groups most recently entering American cities. The conflict flourished in an atmosphere not conducive to sacrifice on the part of white ethnics, and in an atmosphere, at the same time, increasingly tolerant of a politics based on cultural diversity.

Furthermore, a curious combination of temporal events further encouraged the re-emergence of white ethnic groups. To begin, we note the pattern of birth rates. Lubell states that the birth rate among immigrants was extremely high between 1905 and 1910. Hence the real population explosion among immigrant groups did not occur until the 1930s. The appearance in the 1930s of large numbers of children of immigrants helped to produce a heightened level of conflict in that decade, as accommodations had to be reached between groups greatly swollen in numbers. The children of these immigrants' children would not reach political maturity until the 1960s. Lubell (1965:46) states this bluntly:

> Not until the late 1960s will the record number of births (of ethnic whites in the 1930s) register politically. Until then the nation's political metabolism is likely to remain more sluggish than during the Roosevelt years. The issues of realignment will have to be fought out primarily among existing population elements whose instinctive voting attitudes are already largely formed.

Thus the rise of ethnic conflict in the 1960s can be partially explained by increased birth rates and the coming of age of a new generation of ethnic whites forced to come to terms with the political life of their society.

In addition, the 1960s saw the coming of age of a generation that had been too young to absorb in any significant way the experiences of World War II. As mentioned above, the war had the effect of lessening the relevance and intensity of ethnic conflict in the United States. The war also had the effect of virtually destroying German-Americans as a nationality group and perhaps delaying the emergence in full power of

Italo-Americans. Countless others who had come of age during the Second World War must have had their ethnic consciousness weakened by the nature of the conflict and of appeals to be Americans first.

The war also acted as a crucial factor in turning the attention of social scientists away from an ethnicity based on nationality, the focus of research in the 1920s and 1930s, toward an ethnicity based on religion, which became the focus during the 1940s and 1950s. The re-emergence of interest in ethnicity based on nationality identification is being pushed to a large degree by a generation too young to have caught even the backlash of that wartime Americanism.

A third sequence is also taking place. The one area in which ethnic conflict has been most open has been that of school policy. In particular, the issues of compensatory education and the demand for community control of schools have been focal points of conflict. To be sure, demands for community control and increased "remedial" services have spread to other city functions; however, it is with regard to schools that demands have been most vocal. Blacks and Puerto Ricans claim that schools have failed to serve their needs and therefore desire to see radical changes in the school system. White ethnics respond that the schools were good enough for them, their parents, and their grandparents, and that whites were able to succeed in the existing school systems. Therefore, if blacks and Puerto Ricans are failing in school, it is not because the schools are faulty, but because there is something wrong with those who fail. Whites oppose changes in the schools and other services because they perceive that these changes would benefit blacks and Spanish-speaking groups at their (white ethnics') expense. Thus whites have become a conservative force in the face of threats to an order which they view as having been successful in the past.

Only the passage of time could allow white ethnics to hold such beliefs. First generation and, to a lesser extent, second generation immigrants had abysmal success rates in the school system (and indeed, in other public services) (Greer, 1972). Not until the second and third generations have white immigrant groups been able to master the school system. Given this situation, present-day white ethnics *can* look at schools and say that their nationality groups succeeded without special help and attention--despite the fact that their parents and grandparents probably did not succeed at all.

The influx of new black and Spanish-speaking immigrant groups and the corresponding demand on the schools (and other services) has caused resentment on the part of white ethnics who do not see the need to supply new services or alter the traditional distribution or mode of existing services. Thus rising expectations on the part of blacks and Spanish-speaking immigrants who do not wish to see their children fail, coupled with the shortsighted and distorted historical perspective of white ethnics have helped to produce conflict in ethnic terms.

In short, we have noted several conditions that have coincided to produce the pattern that, in light of Handlin's observation, has historically led to heightened ethnic conflict; that is, increased ethnic conflict results from the refusal of established ethnic groups to yield to the demands of newer ethnic groups. Given the fact that some of these newest ethnic groups feel that they are distinguished by race from the now more established European white ethnics, we would expect to see ethnic conflict manifest itself primarily along racial lines. In fact, the Kerner Commission on Civil Disorders reported that American society was moving toward the creation of two separate nations--one black, the other white. But we have seen that the nature of urban politics in the 1960s upset traditional ethnic alignments and arrangements (primarily through an expanded federal government involvement in city politics and increasing demands of new racial ethnic groups). This alone would have served to make ethnic conflict among whites pressing, as new arrangements had to be worked out both among white ethnic groups and between white ethnics and the newest immigrants. However, this conflict was heightened by certain economic and social conditions that made white ethnic groups less willing to make the necessary rearrangements. Finally, the 1960s also witnessed the coming of age of a new generation of white ethnics who saw nothing wrong, and much right, with stressing their nationality backgrounds.

Thus while we might find that the essence of ethnic conflict is primarily racial, white against non-white; certain conditions have served to encourage the fragmentation of this white group into its constituent ethnic stocks.

CHAPTER 2

The Forms of Ethnic Identification

In the previous chapter we argued that the increased level of nationality-based politics was to a large extent a reaction to threats perceived by white ethnics; threats emanating from the black socioeconomic revolution of the 1960s. We also noted that the increased hostility this "revolution" engendered led the Kerner Commission to assert that the United States is moving in the direction of two separate nations, a black nation *vs.* a white one. On the basis of the Kerner Report and other studies of the black community, one could plausibly conclude that the truly meaningful attitudinal and behavioral splits in American society lie between whites and blacks, and that other forms of social cleavage are insignificant in comparison. However, we have seen that the very nature of the threats emanating from black society has caused an increase in interest in the differences that divide the whites of this society into their constituent nationality stocks. Much of the literature on nationality group differences would have us believe that the cleavages between nationality groups are as important as those between racial groups in the United States.

In the 1960s then, we witnessed the emergence of two dominant patterns or "models" of social group identification--a racial model and a nationality model. Since the importance to the political system of the differences between blacks and whites and between the various white nationality groups can be examined empirically, a study of these patterns can indicate the relative importance of these two dominant models of social (or "ethnic") identification in determining political behavior.

However, it should be noted that the term "ethnicity" encompasses at least two additional models or forms of social identification. First, ethnicity based on religious identification has long been of interest to social scientists. Indeed, as we shall see, this form of ethnic identification has frequently been described as the most enduring and important form of social identification evidenced within the white population. Second, ethnicity based on the time at which the large-scale immigration of nationality groups into the United States occurred has also been of interest. This "old/new" ethnic group distinction was probably most important in the earlier part of this century when large waves of immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe were perceived to be a very real threat to American society, but the

implications of this model of ethnic identification can still be found in contemporary discussions of the role of ethnic identification, as can elements from the religious model of ethnicity. In short, we are presented with several models of ethnic identification which are in many ways competing.

Empirical examination of the impact of each form of ethnicity on the political attitudes and behavior of whites as well as an examination of the impact of racial group membership could greatly clarify the meaning of the term "ethnicity." To achieve this clarification, the association of each of the four models with measures of political behavior and attitudes will be undertaken later, using the Comparative State Elections Project 1968 survey data.[1] Before doing so, however, let us more fully explore the models of ethnicity based on religion and on time of arrival in the United States.

I. RELIGIOUS MODEL OF ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION

The premise advocated by many "cultural pluralists" is that ethnicity based on *nationality* groupings is a form of social identification that should be preserved and indeed encouraged (see, *e.g.* Gans, 1962; Novak, 1972; Greeley, 1971). However, at the same time that we might desire distinct nationality groupings, the intermarriage rates between nationality groups are high enough to lead to a "dilution" of these nationality-based ethnic groups. This rests on the fact that intermarriages are not random across all ethnic groups. Instead, individuals of certain nationality groups show a distinct propensity to marry individuals of other specific nationality groups--almost always nationality groups sharing the same religion. This intermarriage along religious lines has led some writers to speculate on the existence not of a single melting pot but a "triple melting pot." In other words, it is argued that the actuality of American society may be neither the "melting down" of all nationality groups into a single American group, nor a total lack of assimilation for most nationality groups as proposed by such cultural pluralists as Novak or Greeley, but rather the emergence of three groups--Protestants, Catholics, and Jews--as the dominant form of ethnic pluralism.

As indicated above, this approach is based primarily on the intermarriage patterns of various nationality-based ethnic groups. In addition, several authors argue that this triple distinction is based on the recognition of religious pluralism as the most legitimate form of social identification in America.

II. INTERMARRIAGE AND THE "TRIPLE MELTING POT"

The classic study of intermarriage rates is that of New Haven done by Kennedy in the mid-1940s. She was the first to document the weakening of nationality group endogamy and the continued importance of religious identification in marriage choices. These findings led her to put forth the concept of the "triple melting pot" as "the true expression of what is happening to the various nationality groups in the United States" (Kennedy, 1944:332).

Greeley, writing in 1971, provides more recent empirical data which tend to support Kennedy's argument (although he refuses to accept Kennedy's conclusions). For example, he writes that "Ethnic intermarriage [marriage across nationality-based ethnic groups] is increasing despite the fact that religious intermarriage apparently is not increasing" (Greeley, 1971:82). However, he also notes that even if the spouse is of a different ethnic background, the choice of background is not random; *i.e.*, some ethnic groups prefer to marry other specific ethnic groups (p. 90). Citing the 1957 Current Population Survey of Religion and the 1963 National Opinion Research Center data containing religious identification and intermarriage patterns, Greeley notes that religious endogamy in 1957 ranged from a *low* of 81% for Lutherans, Methodists, and Presbyterians to a high of 94% for Jews. However, for the present generation, the rate of endogamous marriages for nationality groups was much lower--only 55% on the average. Moreover, nationality groups with longer tenure in the United States, for example, Germans and Irish, had the lowest rates of endogamous marriages. It would seem from these data that the passage of time in the United States may increase nationality exogamy. Hence we must expect, given the much lower rates of religious exogamy, that more individuals will be cross-pressured with regard to nationality identification than with regard to religious identification, thus making religion a more important force in the long run.

III. THE IDEOLOGICAL BASIS OF RELIGIOUS PLURALISM

This expectation based on intermarriage patterns is reinforced, it has been argued, by the recognition of religious identification as legitimate while withholding this same degree of legitimacy from nationality identification. Gordon, for example, states that while the impact of minority group culture

has been of modest dimension in most areas, it has been extensive in one--the area of institutionalized religion.

> From a nation overwhelmingly and characteristically Protestant in the late 18th century, America has become a national entity of Protestants, Catholics and Jews--where membership in, or identificational alliance to, one or the other of these three denominations is routinely honored in American public opinion (Gordon, 1964:109).

Thus a trichotomy based on religion is accepted as legitimate by Americans while divisions based on nationality are not traditionally so viewed.

Herberg, perhaps the most influential proponent of this interpretation, believes that the development of this trichotomy is based on the changing nature of immigration to the United States.

> As long as large scale immigration continued, and America was predominantly a land of immigrants...the dominant form of self-identification, and therefore the dominant form of pluralistic diversity, was immigrant ethnicity....
>
> Within the past generation, the picture has changed radically. The stoppage of mass immigration during W.W.I followed by the anti-immigration legislation of the 1920s, undermined the foundations of immigrant ethnic groups with amazing rapidity....
>
> Specifically, within the threefold scheme of race, ethnicity [to use our terms, "nationality"] and religion, a shift has taken place from ethnicity to religion as the dominant form of self-identification, and therefore also in the dominant form of pluralistic diversity (Herberg, 1960:21).

Further empirical evidence can be found in Lenski's 1961 study of Detroit entitled *The Religious Factor*. Lenski found that people more readily identified themselves by religious groups than by nationality groups.[2] He concluded that "there

seems to be little doubt that socio-religious groups are rapidly replacing (nationality) groups as the basic units in the system of status groups in American society" (Lenski, 1961:327).

In short, we are presented with a third model for explaining social behavior. The first model was that described by the Kerner Commission in which society was viewed as split between blacks and whites. In terms of the "threefold schema of race, nationality, and religion," the Kerner Commission would endorse the first variable (race) as the most crucial. The second model presented was that of the "unmeltable ethnic." The proponents of this model stress the nationality variable as crucial. The third model, just presented, stresses the final dimension: religion.

These models offer competing views of the relative importance of the various components of social identification. The proponents of each model would seem to be saying that the dimension stressed by that model is the most crucial; or, to rephrase this, that the model advocated is most strongly associated with social behavior and attitudes. Thus knowing a person's identification along the variable that the model stresses (race, nationality, or religion) would give us the most information about how that individual will behave, and how the system will react to individual behavior. These questions are open to empirical investigation.

IV. THE "OLD/NEW" MODEL OF ETHNIC DIFFERENTIATION

Before proceeding with a comparison of the empirical effects of the three models of ethnic behavior already described, one further form of ethnic identification, alluded to above, will be introduced. Frequently used by social scientists (though often implicitly) in analyzing the effects of ethnic identification on political behavior, this is the difference perceived between old and new ethnic groups.

The nature of the old/new ethnic differences hypothesized is intimately connected with the concept of Anglo-Conformity and the prestige of the White Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture as the "core culture" of the United States. Prior to the 1880s, most immigrants coming to the United States came from Northern or Western Europe. These "older" immigrant groups shared (or, perhaps more accurately, are envisioned by many of today's

writers as having shared) many of the orientations and cultural predispositions of the existing core of United States society. For example, the German immigrants, while possessing a different language from the core culture, possessed skills that were highly in demand by the growing American economy. They were assimilated into American society in large degree (Warner, 1962:5-6). Similarly, the Scotch-Irish immigrants (who preceded and were distinct from the later large waves of Irish immigration) possessed skills and cultural orientations valued by the American society.

The large waves of Irish (not Scotch-Irish) immigrants in the 1840s and 1850s are usually regarded as the beginning of a new chapter in the history of immigration into the United States. These Irish immigrants were greeted by hostility and regarded in many ways as inferior to the existing American stock (Warner, 1962:10-11). However, despite this hostility and despite the low socioeconomic status of the immigrants, the Irish are still considered by most writers an "old" immigrant group, who, as measured by closeness to the Anglo-Saxon core, rank as more "prestigious" than the immigrant groups from the south and east of Europe that followed them. Thus while there were nativist movements in the mid-1800s, it is possible to argue that they were not as vitriolic as the ones that greeted the "new" immigrants during the early part of this century (Gordon, 1964:98). Post-World War I saw a

> new wave of restrictionist sentiment...based in a considerable part on the racist assumption of the inherent inferiority and lack of assimilatibility of the immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe.... Its goal was not only to effect a decrease in the total number of immigrants to the U.S., but to set up a formula which would favor the entry of immigrants from Northern and Western Europe and keep the number of the unfavored groups to a minimum (Gordon, 1964:101-102).

That this movement was successful can be seen by the immigration laws of the 1920s.

In a similar vein, but reflecting the vitriolic feelings of the time, Elwood Cubberly, writing in 1934 about the crises in the schools in the early 1900s, states:

> These Southern and Eastern Europeans were of a very different type than the North and West Europeans who preceded them. Largely illiterate, docile, often lacking in initiative, and almost wholly without the Anglo-Saxon conception of righteousness, liberty, law, order, public decency and government, their coming has served to dilute tremendously our national stock and to weaken and corrupt our political life (Cubberly, 1934:485).

These differences between the new and old ethnic group life-styles are still argued. The differences perceived by Cubberly between the Anglo-Saxon conception of government and that of the new immigrants are found also in the work of Hofstadter (1955) and have been reiterated in debates on differing political ethos by such social scientists as Banfield and Wilson (1964), Wolfinger (1966), and Lineberry (1967).

Current discussions of political ethos no longer rest specifically on the imputation of the superiority of Anglo-Saxons as a "race" over other Europeans, but instead rest on the purported disposition of certain ethnic groups to perceive the "public interest" in a narrow, selfishly defined way.

V. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF ETHOS

This recent development, relating ethnicity to a difference in political ethos, seems to have begun with Hofstadter's *The Age of Reform* (1955). Hofstadter writes of the existence of two ethics of government:

> One, founded upon the *indigenous Yankee-Protestant political traditions, and upon middle class life*, assumed and demanded the constant, disinterested activity of the citizen in public affairs, argued that political life ought to be run, to a greater degree than it was, in accordance with general principles and abstract laws apart from and superior to personal needs, and expressed a common feeling that government should be in good part an effort to moralize the lives of individuals while economic life should be intimately related to the stimulation and development of

> individual character. The other system, founded upon the *European background of the immigrants*, upon their familiarity with hierarchy and authority, and upon the urgent needs that grew out of their migration, took for granted that the political life of the individual would arise out of family needs, interpreted political and civic relations chiefly in terms of personal obligation and placed strong personal loyalties above allegiance to abstract codes of laws and morals (Hofstadter, 1955:9, emphasis added).

It is important to note one connection that seems to have led to endless confusion. Hofstadter argues that the first, the "other-regarding," ethos is based on "indigenous Yankee traditions" as well as "middle class life." The second system is based primarily on the "European background of the immigrants," *i.e.*, new immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe, and then upon the "urgent needs" of immigration. Thus there is confusion between class and ethnic differences, a confusion that reappears frequently with regard to the existence of two distinct ethics, on the one hand, and of differences between new and old ethnic groups on the other.

For example, Gans, while not addressing the ethos argument directly, develops two alternative explanations for the nature of West End political and social life (as we saw above, the West End was characterized by a "peer group society" that was highly self-contained and "self-regarding"). Gans first offers the possibility that the immigrants brought with them from Southern Italy their accustomed life-style. Gans (1962: 200) states that "the society and culture of the West Enders are quite similar to those of Southern Italians, past and present."

The proposition that immigrant groups carry along with them their predispositions toward government would seem to support the position that differences exist between old (Western European) and new (Eastern European) ethnic groups because the political cultures of Western Europe are more similar to that of the United States than are the political cultures of other European countries (Almond and Verba, 1963). However, Gans rejects this position and contends instead that the peer-group society is really a class phenomenon: "An alternative

hypothesis, however--that the peer group society is a working-class phenomenon and that class differences separate the West Enders from the middle class--is more justified" (Gans, 1962: 229). Despite this statement, the conceptual problem is never really resolved by Gans.

VI. WILSON AND BANFIELD AND THE CONCEPT OF ETHOS

The difficulty in separating class and ethnicity also appears in the work of Wilson and Banfield. From their analysis of voting on local bond and expenditure referenda, they conclude that "the voting behavior of some classes tends to be more public-regarding and less private- (or self- or family-) regarding than that of others" (Wilson and Banfield, 1964:876). Furthermore,

> voters in some income and ethnic groups are more likely than others to take a public-regarding rather than a narrowly self-interested view of things.... We offer the additional hypothesis that both the tendency of a voter to take a public-regarding view and the content of that view...are largely functions of his participation in a subculture that is definable in ethnic and income terms. Each subcultural group, we think, has a more or less distinctive notion of how much a citizen ought to sacrifice for the sake of the community as well as of what the welfare of the community is constituted....
>
> We do not think that income per se has this effect rather it is the ethnic attributes, or culture, empirically associated with it (p. 885).

Thus they argue that ethnicity, not income, is the main cause of the differences of ethos between groups. This they support by their finding that for most of the expenditure issues they studied, the "percentage of Poles and Czechs (in a district) is a more important influence on voting than median family income" (p. 883). Poles and Czechs, therefore, are ethnic groups that are more self-regarding, regardless of their income level. Presumably further research would permit similar statements about other ethnic groups in the population. While the logic of this position seems clear, Wilson and Banfield are by no means consistent in endorsing it. In a rejoinder to a critique of their work (Wolfinger and Field, 1966), Wilson and Banfield

come closest to an explicit clarification of the connections between ethnic identification and class membership. In the critique, Wolfinger and Field were unable to find empirical links between ethnicity and the institutions of city government, links that Banfield and Wilson had stipulated in their earlier work, *City Politics* (1963). In response, Banfield and Wilson claim that the ethos theory is concerned with attitudes rather than institutions, and that the theory "does not assert that the attitudes in question will be translated into institutional form. [But what it does] say is that when an issue arises the cleavages will be along the lines discussed"; *i.e.*, Anglo-Saxon and middle class will be on the opposite side from the "newer" ethnic groups (Wilson and Banfield, 1966:999). Thus Banfield and Wilson contrast Anglo-Saxon voters and middle class with the newer ethnic groups (but not with the lower class). The argument seems to imply that the newer immigrant's ethos is equivalent to a lower-class ethos.

This relatively clear position, however, becomes confused when one examines two other works by the same authors. In their earlier work, *City Politics*, Banfield and Wilson describe a set of cleavages that define politics in the urban area. One cleavage discussed is that between the different classes in a city. The authors argue that any city can be envisioned as consisting of three classes--upper, middle, and lower. Conflict in the city can then be seen as an alliance between upper and lower classes who are "big spenders" *vs.* the middle class who desire lower taxes and a higher disposable personal income. Here, the middle class is perceived as most self-regarding. However, in rejoinder to Wolfinger and Field, the same authors picture the middle class as part of an other-regarding alliance with the "Anglo-Saxons."

This apparent shift in position can in part be related to the emergence of the black revolution in the 1960s and to the issues that reemerged as a result, *i.e.*, the re-institution of "divisible goods" over "collective goods" as the central issue of city politics. Thus when Banfield and Wilson refer in *City Politics* to the lower class, they seem to be referring primarily to blacks. The middle class there described appears to be the "newer" ethnic groups, those who have been in the United States long enough to be owners of small homes and other relatively inexpensive property, *i.e.*, the lower middle class. Hence the middle class referred to as being involved in an "other-regarding" alliance with the Anglo-Saxons must be the

older immigrant groups who have been able to accumulate more property and are more a part of American society.

Thus the "new" versus "old" ethnic group distinction is based not on the racial inferiority of a group, nor on variations in immigrant experiences, but on the increased possession of property that has accrued to groups with older roots in the United States. Some of these implications have been recognized by Wilson and Banfield in their 1971 work on political ethos. Unfortunately, while this more recent work does seek conceptual clarification of this issue, it serves *in toto* only to add further contortions to the argument. For example, Wilson and Banfield recognize explicitly the confusion in their use of the term "middle class." "(T)he 'middle-class' Anglo-Saxon Protestants we wrote of in *City Politics* would have been better described as 'upper-class' or 'upper-middle class'" (Wilson and Banfield, 1971:1049). But then in an attempt to separate the class and ethnic differences that had been confounded, Wilson and Banfield dismiss the immigrant experience as an important determinant of the "self-regarding" ethos. Instead, they introduce a newly named "individualistic ethos" (also called localist) and a "unitary ethos" (holist) to replace the old forms of ethos.

The question of which group is characterized by which ethos is now open to empirical investigation with no preconceived notion of the distribution of attitudes. Unfortunately, having no preconceived notions of such distributions, the authors become involved in an extremely obscure examination of the attitudes in question. For example, we are told that of all the "holists" (individuals who were previously called "other-regarding") in the sample, a certain percentage are black, a certain percentage Jewish, and a certain percentage Italian (Wilson and Banfield, 1971:1052, 1058, 1059, tables). However, we are never told the distribution of "holists" and "localists" within any given group; we are never told what percentage of the Jews or Italians in the sample is holist and what percentage is localist. This makes comparison between ethnic groups impossible. The problem is further compounded by the fact that we are never told if a weighting scheme has been employed to take into account the relative size of the ethnic groups in the sample. We cannot tell whether the percentage of holists coming from a particular ethnic group is a function of the size in the sample of that group or is really indicative of the underlying attitudinal structure of an ethnic group.

The authors thus dismissed an *a priori* scheme in favor of one based on empirical investigation; the conduct of their investigation was, however, characterized by severe shortcomings. Yet in all honesty one must note that not all *a priori* judgments were dismissed. In their investigation of the distribution of attitudes, Wilson and Banfield found Polish and Irish respondents to be frequently in favor of "good government." Rather than accepting this as a reliable result of their survey, Wilson and Banfield make this curious statement concerning the validity of their work:

> [The Polish and the Irish] are groups that tend to report having had a religious upbringing and that tend also to have relatively little schooling and income. We conjecture that this background may dispose many of them to respond in interview situations on the basis of a highly conventionalized, or 'text-book,' code of civic morality which tells them that 'rules are rules' and makes no provision (as would utilitarianism, for example) for dealing with difficult cases. If we are right about this, these voters' endorsement of good government has little value as an indicator of the choices that would be made in 'real life' situations (Wilson and Banfield, 1971:1059).

In short, besides gratuitously disparaging the meaningfulness of their own and other authors' work based on survey research, Wilson and Banfield add nothing (except perhaps more confusion) to investigation of variations in ethos between and among ethnic groups. In particular, they further confuse the original basis for their argument, the idea that old and new ethnic groups differ in their perceptions of proper government activity.

VII. ETHOS AND FORMS OF CITY GOVERNMENT

One additional example of the use of the old/new distinction appears in the work of many social scientists but is not explicitly recognized. This is the use of a measure of the percentage foreign stock in a city as crucial in predicting the type of government and the level of public services to be found within cities. Two examples will illustrate. In *City Politics*,

Banfield and Wilson indirectly link the dichotomy of ethos (at that point still connected to the immigrant experience of new ethnic groups) to the way in which city services are administered. The "other-regarding" ethos, for example, is characterized by greater concern with the process of carrying out city services in a way that is honest, efficient, and impartial (Banfield and Wilson, 1963). The "self-regarding" immigrant ethos, on the other hand, tolerates politicians who maintain their power by sacrificing the integrity and efficiency of city services to provide favors and jobs to sustain a political machine. Thus the type of city administration to be found within an urban area depends largely on the proportional size of a large immigrant population holding a self-regarding ethos. This argument is supported by the work of Cornwall (1964), who contends that political machines and bosses depend on immigration for their survival.

Wolfinger and Field (1966) have taken the implications of this dichotomy even farther. They suggest that the difference in orientation toward administration posited by Wilson and Banfield should manifest itself in the form of city government, *e.g.*, mayor-council *vs.* city manager, partisan *vs.* nonpartisan elections. However, in examining this apparently logical connection, Wolfinger and Field find that when the relationship between ethnicity and form of government is examined within regions, most of the relationships between *percent ethnic* in a city and form of city government are eliminated. Note that Wolfinger and Field use percent foreign stock (ethnic) as their indicator of a milieu supportive of the self-regarding ethos--a higher percent foreign stock, they imply, indicates greater support for both the self-regarding ethos and the resultant unreformed city government.

This use of percent foreign stock, however, substantially neglects one important aspect of intergroup differences in political ethos. The ethos argument asserts that certain ethnic groups are characterized by a self-regarding ethos while other groups are not (regardless of the reasons given for those differences). Thus to use percent foreign stock as the indicator of self-regarding ethos is to assume that which the ethos theory is designed to investigate. But this use of percent foreign stock does bring into sharp relief the implied connections between the ethos argument and the old/new ethnic group distinction.

We have seen that the differences perceived between old and new ethnic groups connect with the perception of differences

between the ethnic groups of Northern-Western Europe and those of Eastern-Southern Europe. The latter group is considered "new" because it arrived considerably after the waves of immigration from Northern and Western Europe. Thus when Wolfinger and Field use percent foreign stock as their measure of a milieu supportive of a self-regarding ethos, they really imply that new immigrant groups possess this ethos to a greater extent than native Americans, *i.e.*, "old" ethnic groups. The implication of these works is that there exists a fourth form of ethnic differentiation, one based on old *vs.* new immigrant status.

VIII. THE FOUR FORMS OF ETHNICITY: A SUMMARY

We have seen that social scientists nave identified at least four distinct forms of ethnic differentiation structuring political attitudes and behavior:

1) the "two nations" hypothesis suggested by the Kerner Commission which isolates the non-white *vs.* white (racial) dimension;

2) cultural pluralism which stresses differences between white nationality groups;

3) the triple melting pot which emphasizes the religious dimension;

4) the old *vs.* new ethnic group distinction which looks to the area of Europe from which an individual (or his ancestors) came, and stresses the likelihood that he will in turn hold a particular conception (ethos) of the proper role of government.

As a result of the failure of social scientists to recognize the multidimensional nature of ethnicity, considerable confusion characterizes the state of research into ethnicity's role in shaping political choices and in structuring political actions. Thus a single term, ethnicity, is used to refer to at least four different types of social identification, the bases of which are, at points, mutually exclusive. Moreover, even when aspects of these models do not logically conflict, one model may in fact predominate, leaving study of the others unproductive. While attempts such as those undertaken by Wilson and Banfield, Lineberry and Fowler, and Wolfinger and

Field have been made to identify characteristics of communities in which the political importance of ethnicity flourishes, the absence of any clear theoretical definition of the basic concept of ethnicity severely detracts from these efforts.

Yet these conflicts and confusions which currently weaken the utility of ethnicity as an investigatory tool can be resolved. The first step has been taken above in the theoretical identification of the multidimensional nature of ethnicity. Below, we will undertake an empirical investigation of the relative importance of each model of ethnicity on attitudes and behavior, and attempt to identify more clearly the social processes which account for variation in the occurrence of the various forms of ethnicity. The procedure to be used in our investigation will be explained in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 3

Ethnic Group Differences Across the Nation

We have hypothesized that four distinct forms of ethnicity are found in American society, each stressed by various political analysts in attempts to explain political behavior and attitudes. We have contended further that no general consensus exists regarding the relative importance in politics of the four types of ethnicity. In an effort to clarify this confusion, we will systematically explore the effects of each form of ethnicity on partisan behavior and political attitudes.

Ethnic group differences in three types of partisan behavior will be analyzed; that is, differences in party identification and in voting patterns in presidential and congressional races. The party identification patterns of ethnic groups can be interpreted as indications of long-term commitments by these groups to important actors in the American political system, commitments that define "normal" voting propensities (Converse, 1966). The measure of party identification here used is a "first response" three category variable--respondents were classified as Democratic, Republican, or Independent of either major party.[1]

For the examination of voting patterns (the remaining partisan behavior variables), we are interested in voting choices for presidential candidates in 1968 (Nixon, Humphrey, Wallace), and for congressional candidates in 1968 (Democratic, Republican). Below, we will present data indicating the magnitude of differences in partisan behavior of several ethnic groups on these three variables.

In addition to partisan behavior we are also interested in the effects of ethnic identification on certain issue attitudes. To examine these attitudes, respondents to the Comparative State Elections Project's questionnaire were asked how strongly they agreed or disagreed (on a seven-point scale) to sixteen issue positions.[2] From these sixteen issue questions, three distinct clusters emerge. These clusters are linked not only logically but also empirically. Using factor analysis we find the items in each cluster load together with factor scores greater than .40.

The first cluster of issue attitudes concerns the status of blacks in American society, an intermixing of attitudes toward racial integration, poverty programs, and police authority, similar to that identified by Scammon and Wattenberg (1970:Chap. 3) as the crucial "Social Issue" of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Five issues loading together were selected from the factor analysis and weighted evenly to construct a single scale. The mean score respondents received on the five-item scale was used as an indicator of attitudes toward the "Social Issue." The five questions included in this first scale were the following:

1. *I'd like to work on a job with both Negroes and whites.*
2. *I'd like to see white and Negro children go to the same school.*
3. *The government ought to help Negroes.*
4. *The government should stop spending money on poverty programs.*
5. *The police ought to be given more authority.*[3]

By reversing the values for items 4 and 5, the direction of responses to all questions was made uniform; lower scores can be interpreted as more pro-integration and more pro-black, higher scores reflect "segregationist" and anti-black attitudes.

The second cluster of questions dealt with more "traditional" questions of the economy and government activism in economic affairs. The mean score respondents received on a five-item scale, all items weighted evenly, was used as an indicator of attitudes toward the role of government in the economy. The five questions that clustered together were:

1. *The country needs more jobs and better wages.*
2. *Social Security benefits ought to be increased.*
3. *The government ought to give financial aid to countries that request it.*
4. *The government ought to help labor unions.*
5. *The government ought to help big business.*[4]

The direction of responses in this scale is such that higher scores represent attitudes in favor of a more active economic role for government.

The last set of issue questions dealt with the war in Vietnam, an important and divisive issue at the time of the

1968 election when these data were gathered. Two questions concerning the war were asked.[5] The first question was simply put: *"We must have peace in Vietnam."* Over 90% of all respondents agreed or strongly agreed with this statement. Given this high degree of consensus, ethnic group differences in response to this question are minimal (the lack of variation in response also caused this question not to load on any factor). However, a second question concerning the more vexing problem of how to achieve peace in Vietnam did elicit considerable variation (and loaded by itself as a single-item factor). The question read: *"The government ought to take a stronger stand in Vietnam, even if it means invading North Vietnam"* (hereafter, referred to as "Vietnam stand"). The mean score respondents received on this question is used, therefore, as an indicator of attitudes toward the war (lower scores indicate more disagreement with a strategy of invasion). Below we present mean scores of the responses of various ethnic groups on all three issue clusters to indicate the attitudinal variations existing between ethnic groups in the United States in 1968. First, however, let us return to our discussion of partisan behavior.

I. RACE AND PARTISANSHIP IN 1968

That large differences in the political behavior of whites and non-whites exist in American society is a commonplace finding in studies of American politics. An inspection of Table 3-1 will indicate the degree of racial partisan differences in 1968. In particular, the divergences in the partisan behavior of whites and blacks are quite pronounced. As Table 3-1 indicates, only 42% of the whites in the national sample identified with the Democratic Party. While a substantial proportion, and, indeed, a plurality of whites support the Democratic Party, that percentage constitutes about half the level of Democratic Party identification found among blacks (81%) or among Mexican-Americans (84%).

These differences in party identification between racial groups are quite large, but those seen in actual voting choices in 1968 are even greater. Only 40% of the whites in our sample report voting for Humphrey, while 49% voted for Nixon and 12% for Wallace. Nixon obviously emerged as the most successful candidate among whites, gathering just less than half the votes. However, there was considerable variability in white voting behavior and some degree of meaningful candidate choice was available. For blacks there appears to have been virtually

TABLE 3-1

DIFFERENCES IN PARTISAN BEHAVIOR OF RACIAL GROUPS

Party Identification

	Republican	Democratic	Independent	*N*
Whites*	30.6%	42.4	27.0	6366
Blacks	8.2%	80.8	10.9	704
Mexican-Americans	5.4%	84.3	10.2	132
Puerto Ricans	11.9%	71.6	16.5	50

Reported Presidential Vote

	Nixon	Humphrey	Wallace	*N*
Whites	48.8%	39.7	11.5	5265
Blacks	4.7%	95.2	0.1	505
Mexican-Americans	16.8%	80.5	2.7	81
Puerto Ricans	33.7%	60.0	6.3	25

Reported Congressional Vote

	Republican	Democratic	*N*
Whites	50.8%	49.2	4987
Blacks	9.1%	90.9	407
Mexican-Americans	19.2%	80.8	75
Puerto Ricans	31.9%	68.1	20

*"Whites" include all Caucasians not classified by interviewers as "Mexican-American" or "Puerto Rican." This convention is carried forward in subsequent tables.

no question of choice between the candidates--over 95% of the blacks in the national sample voted for Humphrey, the largest percentage given any candidate by any ethnic group. Blacks are by far the most distinctive racial group in the unanimity of their voting. As noted, 95% of the blacks in the sample voted for Humphrey, a substantially higher proportion than the 81% of Mexican-Americans (or the 60% of Puerto Ricans) who did so.

In Congressional elections, differences between the races are only slightly less. Forty-nine percent of the whites reported voting for Democratic congressional candidates, while

91% of the blacks did so. Support for Democratic candidates is again much higher among blacks than among Mexican-Americans or Puerto Ricans--only 81% of Mexican-Americans and 68% of Puerto Ricans voted for Democratic candidates for Congress.

Thus there are distinct differences in the partisan behavior of racial groups. In particular, while clear racial differences exist in party identification, the candidate choices presented in 1968 further divided the major racial groups in American society. Racial minority groups tended to identify more heavily with the Democratic Party; when considering the 1968 candidates, the racial minority groups were even more Democratic.

Compared to this relatively clear pattern of "racial" partisan behavior, the differences between white ethnic groups are more difficult to describe. We are dealing with three forms of identification: old/new ethnic; nationality; and religion. This alone makes the presentation and interpretation of data more difficult. In addition, no single ethnic group is as distinctive in its partisan behavior as blacks or Mexican-Americans, the two largest "racial" minority groups. Despite these problems in describing the data, one general pattern does emerge: no matter which model of white ethnicity is analyzed, a correlation is evident between time of settlement in the United States and the degree of support for the Democratic Party. Naturally, this can be most easily seen in the old/new model of ethnicity.

II. OLD/NEW ETHNIC PARTISANSHIP IN 1968

Inspection of Table 3-2 shows the degree of difference in the partisan behavior of the old ethnic groups, *i.e.*, those from northern and western Europe, as compared to the new ethnic groups. New ethnics are consistently more Democratic than old ethnics; 49% of new ethnics identified with the Democratic Party and 56% voted for Hubert Humphrey. This is substantially higher than the 40% of old ethnics who thought of themselves as Democrats or the 37% who voted for Humphrey. This high level of new ethnic support for the Democratic presidential candidate, coupled with a high level of support for Democratic congressional candidates (62% of new ethnics voted for Democrats compared to the 46% of old ethnics who voted that way), can be seen as an indication of the continued staying power of a New Deal Democratic Alliance built in large degree on "new" white ethnic groups (see for example, Key, 1955, or Burner,

TABLE 3-2

DIFFERENCES IN PARTISAN BEHAVIOR OF OLD AND NEW WHITE ETHNIC GROUPS

	Party Identification			
	Republican	Democratic	Independent	*N*
Old	33.2%	40.4	26.4	4823
New	19.1%	48.7	32.2	828
	Reported Presidential Vote			
	Nixon	Humphrey	Wallace	*N*
Old	51.5%	36.9	11.5	4017
New	38.7%	56.3	5.0	701
	Reported Congressional Vote			
	Republican	Democratic	*N*	
Old	53.6%	46.4	3819	
New	38.2%	61.8	667	

1968). Furthermore, despite the frequently expressed opinion that votes for Wallace came from new ethnics (see for example, Burnham, 1970), Wallace was more successful among old ethnics (12%) than among new ethnics (5%). In general, new ethnics are consistently more loyal to the Democratic Party and its candidates than are old ethnics.

III. NATIONALITY GROUPS AND PARTISANSHIP

Within this divergence between old and new ethnic groups certain differences do occur between individual nationality groups that are obscured by using only the two categories. There are, for example, differences among the major new ethnic groups (Italians, Polish, and Czech, a general category of other East Europeans, and a fourth category of individuals who reported their "nationality" identification as Jewish) that can be noted (see Table 3-3). Jews are consistently more Democratic than any other group; not only do Jews identify

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TABLE 3-3

DIFFERENCES IN PARTISAN BEHAVIOR OF WHITE NATIONALITY GROUPS*

	Party Identification			
	Republican	Democratic	Independent	N
"Jewish"	7.8%	74.1	18.1	81
Italian	17.0%	56.7	26.3	338
Polish & Czech	20.8%	40.5	38.7	275
East European	28.2%	36.3	35.5	88
Irish	18.9%	50.7	30.5	957
West European	27.5%	48.5	24.1	504
Scandinavian	46.7%	32.8	22.5	303
British	38.4%	37.4	24.2	1172
German	40.4%	35.1	24.4	1039
"Just American"	31.4%	58.0	10.6	784

	Reported Presidential Vote			
	Nixon	Humphrey	Wallace	N
"Jewish"	10.8%	89.2	0.0	77
Italian	33.3%	60.4	6.2	274
Polish & Czech	47.4%	48.8	3.8	244
East European	53.2%	41.4	5.4	78
Irish	40.1%	45.0	14.9	771
West European	47.9%	42.6	9.5	379
Scandinavian	50.0%	44.2	5.8	279
British	55.2%	31.8	13.0	1018
German	57.7%	33.7	8.5	900
"Just American"	52.2%	34.1	13.7	618

	Reported Congressional Vote		
	Republican	Democratic	N
"Jewish"	20.5%	79.5	73
Italian	32.6%	67.4	260
Polish & Czech	44.4%	55.6	232
East European	48.0%	52.0	74
Irish	44.7%	55.3	728
West European	47.2%	52.8	369
Scandinavian	57.1%	42.9	264
British	55.4%	44.6	960
German	60.6%	39.4	861
"Just American"	51.8%	48.2	586

*Collapsed CSEP nationality categories are defined here as follows: "Other East European" includes Moravian, Hungarian, Russian and White Russian, Ukrainian, Armenian, Bessarabian, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Yugoslavian, Greek, Bulgarian, Rumanian, and Albanian; "Other West European" includes French, Dutch, Belgian, Luxembourger, Swiss, Spanish, Portuguese and those calling themselves "European"; "Scandinavian" includes Norwegian, Swedish, Finnish, Danish, and Icelandic; "British" includes English, Welsh, Scottish, Scotch-Irish (but not Irish); and "German" includes Austrian.

heavily with the Democratic Party, but this group also supported Democratic candidates more strongly than any other white ethnic group. We will give more attention to the Jewish group in the following section on religion and partisanship.

Of the remaining new ethnic nationality groups, Italians are the most consistently Democratic. A larger proportion of Italians identified with the Democratic Party (57%) than did the Polish and Czechs (41%) or other East Europeans (36%). When presented with a choice for president in 1968, more Italians voted for the Democratic candidate (60%) than did the Polish (49%) or East Europeans (41%). Interestingly, however, of these three groups, Italians appeared to give Wallace the largest vote; slightly more than 6% of the Italians in the sample reported a vote for Wallace, exceeding the 4% of the Polish and the 5% of the East Europeans who voted for Wallace. Despite this, it can be seen that Italians are among the strongest supporters of the Democratic Party. Indeed, except for Jews, Italians gave Humphrey the largest proportion of the vote of any white nationality group. Similarly, in reported votes for Congress, Italians were the most consistent voters for Democratic candidates.

Compared to the high level of support for the Democratic Party and for Democratic candidates by these nationality groups, older stock ethnic groups are more Republican. Scandinavians report the highest percent of Republican Party identification of any nationality group (45%) followed by Germans (40%) and British (38%). These three nationality groups also gave Nixon clear majority support. Moreover, these were the only three nationality groups to give Republican congressional candidates a majority of their votes. The British and the Germans also gave Wallace a substantial percentage of their votes (13% and 9%, respectively); this of course means that within these two groups Humphrey was less successful.

Compared with this low level of Democratic Party support, the Irish seem to represent a transition toward the higher levels of Democratic support found among "new" nationality groups. The Irish identify more frequently with the Democratic Party than the other older groups, but not quite as often as several of the newer nationality groups. Given a choice among candidates in 1968, the Irish again fall between the two types of nationality groups. Thus the Irish gave a larger share of their vote to Humphrey (45%) and to Democratic congressional candidates (55%) than did Germans, British,

Scandinavians, or other West Europeans. Yet this level of candidate support was not as great as that given Democratic candidates by Italians, Poles, or Jews.

The transitional role that the Irish have played in American migration history is replicated in their partisan behavior. Not quite an old stock nationality group but not yet a new one, in their partisan behavior the Irish fall between groups that are more easily classified. Perhaps because of this transitional role and the inconsistencies in status and position implied, the Irish were the most volatile group in their partisan behavior as measured by support for Wallace; the Irish gave Wallace the largest proportion of votes of any nationality group (15%). As will be seen in Table 3-5, the Irish were also by far the most anti-black nationality group, as measured by mean responses on the social issue scale. This too may be a result of the transitional status of the Irish in American society (the explanation presented by Sexton and Sexton, 1971:Chap. 14).

From the data on partisan behavior, there emerges a general ranking of nationality groups. Clearly, old nationality groups tend to be the most Republican, while newer ethnic groups tend to be the strongest supporters of the Democratic Party. The Irish fall in between. This ranking of partisan behavior mirrors the settlement history of ethnic groups and is again reflected in the partisan behavior of America's three major religious groups.

IV. RELIGION AND PARTISANSHIP

There is a remarkable consistency between white religious preference and partisan behavior (see Table 3-4). Uniformly, Protestants are the most Republican in all three forms of partisan behavior, Jews the most Democratic, and Catholics in between.

Across the nation as a whole, 38% of the white Protestants said that they were Republican while only about 17% of the Catholics and 10% of the Jews identified with the Republican Party. In voting choices the same pattern is found; Nixon was most successful among Protestants (55%), then among Catholics (40%), and least successful among Jews (15%). Similarly, Wallace received his strongest support from Protestants (15%), then from Catholics (6%), and substantially less from Jews (less than one half of one percent). The figures for congressional candidates show the expected ranking.

TABLE 3-4

DIFFERENCES IN PARTISAN BEHAVIOR OF WHITE RELIGIOUS GROUPS

Party Identification

	Republican	Democratic	Independent	N
Protestant	37.5%	38.3	24.1	4151
Catholic	17.1%	49.5	33.4	1756
Jewish	10.3%	65.8	23.8	203

Reported Presidential Vote

	Nixon	Humphrey	Wallace	N
Protestant	55.1%	30.2	14.7	3403
Catholic	40.1%	54.0	5.8	1486
Jewish	15.3%	84.4	0.3	190

Reported Congressional Vote

	Republican	Democratic	N
Protestant	55.7%	44.3	3222
Catholic	43.4%	56.6	1412
Jewish	24.9%	75.1	179

Thus in the nation, there is a relationship between the recency of settlement of white ethnic groups and partisan behavior; the old stock ethnic groups tend to be most Republican while newer stock groups are most Democratic. This difference is reflected also among white religious groups from oldest to newest. Minority racial groups on the other hand, groups that in general have had longer settlement in the United States than most white ethnic groups but are the newest ethnic groups to enter the political system, tend to be even more Democratic in their partisan behavior than new stock white ethnics.

V. ATTITUDES AND ETHNICITY

Of the three sets of issue attitudes identified above, the issue of white/black relations (Scale 1, Table 3-5)

TABLE 3-5

ATTITUDINAL DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN ETHNIC GROUPS (MEAN SCORES)

Racial Groups

Scale 1: Social Issue*

	Mean	Standard Deviation	N	Variance Explained(r^2)†
Whites	3.93	1.14	6481	1%†
Blacks	2.67	0.77	677	
Mexican-Americans	3.33	0.87	132	
Puerto Ricans	3.30	1.01	52	

Scale 2: Economic Issues**

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Variance Explained(r^2)
Whites	4.44	0.89	5%
Blacks	5.07	0.79	
Mexican-Americans	4.92	0.74	
Puerto Ricans	4.99	0.56	

Scale 3: Vietnam Stand***

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Variance Explained(r^2)
Whites	4.71	1.73	3%
Blacks	4.53	1.67	
Mexican-Americans	5.03	1.76	
Puerto Ricans	4.11	1.66	

*Lower mean scores indicate more pro-integrationist attitudes.
**Higher mean scores indicate more pro-(government) spending.
***Lower mean scores indicate more opposition to invasion.
†For all r^2, $p<.001$.

TABLE 3-5 (continued)

White Religious Groups

Scale 1: The Social Issue

	Mean	Standard Deviation	N	Variance Explained(r^2)
Protestant	4.08	1.09	4259	1%
Catholic	3.74	1.07	1768	
Jewish	3.19	1.13	198	

Scale 2: Economic Issues

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Variance Explained(r^2)
Protestant	4.37	0.90	5%
Catholic	4.61	0.83	
Jewish	4.66	0.82	

Scale 3: Vietnam Stand

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Variance Explained(r^2)
Protestant	4.82	1.17	1%
Catholic	4.66	1.71	
Jewish	3.51	1.90	

Old/New Ethnic Groups

Scale 1: Social Issue

	Mean	Standard Deviation	N	Variance Explained(r^2)
Old ethnics	3.88	1.10	4921	0%
New ethnics	3.78	1.04	818	

Scale 2: Economic Issues

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Variance Explained(r^2)
Old ethnics	4.43	0.90	0%
New ethnics	4.65	0.79	

Scale 3: Vietnam Stand

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Variance Explained(r^2)
Old ethnics	4.67	1.73	0%
New ethnics	4.56	1.78	

TABLE 3-5 (continued)

Nationality Groups

Scale 1: Social Issue

	Mean	Standard Deviation	N	Variance Explained(r^2)
"Jewish"	3.71	1.10	76	2%
Italian	3.71	0.96	341	
Polish & Czech	3.98	1.01	274	
East European	3.53	1.16	79	
Irish	4.05	1.19	963	
West European	3.77	1.02	318	
Scandinavian	3.88	0.93	302	
British	3.86	1.13	1194	
German	3.86	0.96	1060	
"Just American"	3.84	1.20	828	

Scale 2: Economic Issues

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Variance Explained(r^2)
"Jewish"	4.83	0.73	1%
Italian	4.63	0.77	
Polish & Czech	4.59	0.76	
East European	4.48	0.80	
Irish	4.54	0.88	
West European	4.53	0.91	
Scandinavian	4.18	1.01	
British	4.35	0.87	
German	4.40	0.87	
"Just American"	4.50	0.92	

Scale 3: Vietnam Stand

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Variance Explained(r^2)
"Jewish"	3.70	1.85	1%
Italian	4.40	1.83	
Polish & Czech	5.00	1.49	
East European	4.36	2.16	
Irish	4.71	1.71	
West European	4.66	1.69	
Scandinavian	5.15	1.68	
British	4.66	1.72	
German	4.74	1.59	
"Just American"	4.53	1.86	

elicited by far the most diverse responses among ethnic groups. Social issue attitudes are more clearly tied to ethnic identification than either attitudes toward economic questions or attitudes toward Vietnam. In particular, social issue attitudes are tied both to racial group membership and to white religious group membership (Table 3-5). The other two forms of ethnic identification have substantially weaker relationships to social issue attitudes.

Analysis of variance using the mean score respondents received on the social issue scale as the dependent variable and racial group membership as the independent variable shows that 11% of the variance in social issue attitudes is explained (r^2=11%) by racial group membership (including whites, blacks, Mexican-Americans, and Puerto Ricans). Moreover, the most important of these differences are between blacks and other racial groups. Inspection of the mean scores of the racial groups on social issue attitudes shows that, not surprisingly, blacks score significantly lower (more pro-integrationist; mean=2.67, standard deviation=.77) than any other racial group. Whites, again not surprisingly, score the highest (mean=3.93, s.d.=1.14). While Mexican-Americans and Puerto Ricans fall in between, they are, in fact, very slightly closer to whites than they are to blacks (mean=3.33, s.d.=.87 for Mexican-Americans; mean=3.30, s.d.=1.01 for Puerto Ricans).

Racial attitudinal differences are most pronounced on the social issue scale. Attitudinal differences between the races are much less concerning economic issues (only 5% of the variance is explained) and almost nonexistent on the question of Vietnam stand (only 0.3% of the variation is explained).

When we turn to attitudinal differences among whites, we find that differences among religious groups tend to be more distinct than those between other types of white ethnic groups. Again, these differences are most evident in regard to the social issue. Thirteen percent of the variance in social issue attitudes is explained by white religious group identification. Jews are clearly the most pro-integration (mean=3.19), Protestants the least (mean=4.08). Attitudinal differences between religious groups lessen substantially on the other two issue scales. Religious identification explains only 5% of the variance in economic attitudes and only 15% of the variance in attitudes toward the question of invading North Vietnam. While Jews are clearly more opposed to the possibility of invasion than are other religious groups, the large standard deviation (1.90) indicates a high level of

disagreement among Jews. Indeed, the large standard deviation for each category of religious identification shows why religion explains so little of the variance in this issue scale.

Thus religious identification had some significant impact on issue attitudes. In particular, Jews stand out as racial and economic liberals and, despite a high degree of intragroup disagreement, the most opposed to invading North Vietnam. But we must note that while religion is more strongly associated with issue attitudes than are the other forms of white ethnicity, its impact is simply not that great; that is, the amount of variance explained is small. The impact of the other two forms of white ethnicity is even less. Thus white nationality identification is barely related to any of the issues--explaining only 2% of the variance in social issue attitudes, 1% in economic attitudes and 1% of the attitudinal variation regarding the invasion of North Vietnam.

The last form of ethnicity, old/new ethnic stock, is even less strongly associated with issue attitudes. New ethnics are more willing to accept blacks into society, but just barely; new ethnics are slightly more in favor of economic activism by government than are old ethnics; and new ethnics are slightly more opposed to invading North Vietnam than are old ethnics. None of these differences is statistically significant and this form of ethnicity is least important in explaining issue attitudes.

Across the nation, therefore, white ethnic identification does not appear to have been of great importance in defining issue attitudes. Differences in the attitudes of racial groups toward the domestic issue of integration (Scale 1) are most pronounced. Blacks were highly consistent in their attitudes in support of greater social integration. This can be seen by the small standard deviation characterizing black responses to the social issue scale (Scale 1). Whites, on the other hand, were significantly more divided in their attitudes toward this issue, *i.e.*, the standard deviation for whites was much larger than that for blacks. Insofar as white ethnicity helps to explain differences in the attitudes of whites toward this issue, religious identification is more strongly related to white issue attitudes than are the other forms of white ethnicity.

When we examine response patterns to the other two issue areas, we again find significant differences between racial groups (although these differences are much less pronounced

than toward the social issue). Among whites, religion continues to be more important than nationality identification or old/new ethnic stock in explaining variation in issue attitudes (Table 3-5). Ethnicity's impact on attitudes is not very strong.

Ethnicity's relationship to partisan behavior appears to be slightly greater; certainly, racial partisan differences are great (Table 3-1). In particular, the isolation of blacks from other racial groups is quite evident. For whites, the effects of ethnicity are less obvious. While there is an interesting correspondence between partisan behavior and ethnic group status, *i.e.*, how "old" or "new" an ethnic group is, the overall effects of white ethnicity do not appear to be great.

A measure of the strength of association (Cramer's V) between the various forms of ethnicity and partisanship quantifies these relationships (Table 3-6) and permits their comparison. Note that race consistently has the strongest relationship to partisanship, *i.e.*, its V coefficient is highest. Differences between whites and blacks, excluding Mexican-Americans and Puerto Ricans, are shown in parenthetical coefficients.

Returning to the percentage breakdowns for a moment, it can be seen that the partisan behavior of racial groups closely parallels issue attitudes. Blacks were the most consistent Democratic partisans and the degree of "variation" in their partisan behavior was minimal (Table 3-1). This can be seen also in the overwhelming endorsement given to Humphrey (95% of the blacks in the sample voted for him). Whites, on the other hand, showed much greater internal variation in their partisan behavior; their party identification and candidate preferences were much more dispersed over the available choices.

Moreover, just as we found that religious identification was the form of ethnicity most strongly associated with attitudinal variation among whites, inspection of Table 3-6 shows that religious identification is most strongly related to the partisan behavior of whites. Although the relationships between white ethnicity and partisanship are weak (much weaker than interracial differences), comparatively, religious identification has the most consistent impact on the partisan behavior of whites.

While the differences between racial groups may be somewhat less than would have been hypothesized from a total acceptance of the "two nations" argument, the expected racial

TABLE 3-6

STRENGTH OF RELATIONSHIP (CRAMER'S V)
BETWEEN FOUR MODELS OF ETHNICITY AND PARTISAN BEHAVIOR

	Party I.D.	Presidential Choice	Congressional Choice
Race	.25 (.29)*	.28 (.35)	.27 (.31)
Religion	.16	.21	.11
Nationality	.14	.16	.11
Old/New	.10	.14	.12

*Numbers in parentheses are for blacks and whites only; numbers not in parentheses include Mexican-Americans and Puerto Ricans.

differences in partisan behavior and political opinions appear consistently. Compared to race, the nature of the impact of white ethnicity is much more unexpected, and the explanation of the relationship between white ethnicity and political behavior will concern us most.

Given the interest widely expressed in the role of white ethnicity in politics, its weak impact on the forms of political behavior we have measured seems somehow incongruous. We would have anticipated a greater impact of ethnicity on partisan behavior and issue attitudes than that observed. Moreover, the greater relative importance attached to white religious identification compared to other forms of white ethnicity is even more surprising. We have earlier suggestsd that in the late 1960s, interest in white ethnicity was concerned mostly with nationality identification. We would have expected that nationality identification would be the form of white ethnicity most closely related to political behavior and attitudes. This was not the case. Across the nation religious group identification was in fact more important in structuring political behavior and attitudes among whites than was nationality identification.

One conceivable explanation for this unusual finding is the possibility that there are significant variations in subpopulations of ethnic groups, variations obscured by using the entire nation as a unit of analysis. Put differently, "controls" should be instituted to clarify the patterns of

ethnic politics. Most works on ethnic politics assume this, and almost always controls or limits are imposed on the conclusions advanced. The two sets of controls most frequently used are for (1) size of place of residence and (2) social class. These two controls will be instituted and the national sample reexamined below. A third control, also frequently suggested, is that for region. The possibility exists that regional variations in the importance of ethnicity are hidden in a national sample (see analysis in Schneider, 1976). First, however, let us describe our controls for class and size of place of residence and the rationale for their use.

VI. SIZE OF PLACE OF RESIDENCE

Size of place of residence has been frequently used as an important control variable in examining ethnic politics. Perhaps the most commonly postulated residential factor having an effect on ethnic identification is the perceived lack of importance of ethnic identification in suburban communities as compared to central cities. Most of the literature on ethnic group politics and behavior seems to agree with the proposition that movement from the central city to the suburbs is a critical act in terms of social behavior. It is argued that the move to the suburbs in many ways amounts to a renunciation of one's past economic and social world. It is postulated that the new influences of suburban life do not support ethnic identification. Hence, suburbanization is viewed as a process that leads inevitably to the decline of ethnicity as a salient characteristic in determining social and political behavior.

Often included in this discussion is the added assumption that the move to the suburbs indicates upward social mobility. Scott Greer states this argument succinctly: "There is strong evidence that suburban residence is related to acculturation and upward mobility" (1969:172). However, even given this interweaving of influences, Greer also suggests that suburbanization has a loosening effect on ethnic ties independent of social mobility:

> with suburbanization [people] move out of their neighborhoods where they were segregated among others of their 'own kind.' The suburbs would seem to work against preserving the ethnic subculture, for they throw the new suburbanites into relationships with neighbors of varying origin--rather than with friends, kin, *piasani*, of the city block...(Greer, 1969:185).

Further evidence supporting the position that suburbanization weakens the effects of ethnic identification on political behavior can be found in Wilson and Banfield's (1964) article on political ethos. While expressly interested in analyzing the ethos of various ethnic groups in Cleveland and suburban Cuyahoga County, the data they present support the argument that suburbanization weakens the impact of ethnicity on political behavior.

Table 3-7, reproduced from Wilson and Banfield (1966), indicates that the correlation between percent ethnic and percent "yes" on the ten expenditure issues studied tended to be higher in the city than in the suburbs. The correlation between percent of foreign stock in the political divisions of the suburban county and the percent voting "yes" was insignificant in all cases except one. In the city, however, this correlation was significant for seven out of the ten expenditure issues. The data also show that the correlation between percent Polish-Czech and the percent voting "yes" is stronger in the city in nine out of the ten cases analyzed. As Wilson and Banfield point out, certain ethnic groups (in this case, Polish-Czech) do exert a stronger influence on their members than others. Nevertheless, all groups manifest less control in the suburbs than in the city.

As mentioned, this weakening effect in the suburbs is associated both with upward mobility and the breakup of ethnic enclaves within the central city. Previously, we stated that the ethnic enclaves in the city are usually able to provide a comprehensive set of social structures that allows an "ethnic" individual to spend the greater part of his life in the confines of this ethnic community. Furthermore, the more complete an ethnic community is, the less contact the members of that community have with "natives," or individuals of different ethnic backgrounds (Breton, 1970). Therefore, if suburbanization leads to the movement of ethnics into less "complete" ethnic communities, the effects of ethnicity would have to be less. As we have just seen, there is strong evidence to support this conclusion.

However, there is at least some contrary evidence to suggest that the diluting effects of suburbanization may not be as strong as generally believed. Parenti (1967) contends that the type of analysis suggesting a breakdown of ethnic consciousness because of social mobility assumes certain conditions that do not in fact exist. Most important, Parenti argues that group social mobility has not occurred. While

TABLE 3-7

PARTIAL CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SELECTED "ETHNIC" VARIABLES AND PERCENTAGE VOTING "YES" ON EXPENDITURES IN CLEVELAND AND CUYAHOGA COUNTY WARDS AND TOWNS*

Issue	Foreign Stock		Polish-Czech	
	City	Suburbs	City	Suburbs
Admin. Building	-0.40	ns**	-0.54	-0.17
County Hospital	ns	ns	-0.79	-0.40
TB Hospital	ns	-0.22	-0.74	-0.46
Court House	-0.47	ns	-0.58	-0.28
Juvenile Court	-0.46	ns	-0.74	-0.40
Parks (1959)	-0.41	ns	-0.62	-0.31
Welfare Levy	-0.58	ns	-0.71	-0.49
Roads and Bridges	-0.48	ns	-0.66	-0.40
Zoo	-0.62	ns	-0.71	-0.40
Parks (1960)	ns	ns	ns	-0.50

*These are partial correlation coefficients derived from a regression analysis in which home ownership, median family income, and two "ethnic" variables have been held constant.

**If the correlations were not significant at the .05 level (Student's *t*), "ns" is entered in the table. The critical values were based on 27 degrees of freedom for the city data and 84 degrees of freedom for the suburban data.

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white ethnic groups have indeed improved their absolute economic condition in society, Parenti contends that they have not improved their relative standing and is supported in this contention by the findings of Greer (1972), Howe (1971), and Sexton (1971). If true, one cannot argue that social mobility has weakened ethnic identification because in fact there has been little mobility for ethnic groups as a whole.

With regard to a slightly different dimension, that of residential segregation within cities, there is some additional

quantitative data to support Parenti's argument. Lieberson (1963:18) found that although the residential segregation of ten selected white nationality groups from the native white population declined over a forty-year time period, there was a remarkably high degree of stability in the relative levels of segregation of these groups.

Furthermore, there is no need to assume that moving to the suburbs indicates a move into a less "complete" ethnic community. Suburban communities are usually segregated along social lines ("areal specialization"), and people choose to move to a particular suburb because of this specialization. It is possible, even probable, that the ethnic makeup of a community is a condition that an ethnic white from the city considers when choosing a suburb to which to move. Further, if ethnic groups maintain the relative social standing of the past, economic constraints will tend to reinforce any selectivity based on ethnicity alone.

One additional point that Parenti makes should be noted. Given today's means of communication and transportation, ethnic communities can be maintained without the spatial concentration necessary in the past. The mobility of the suburban society, based on automobile ownership, makes it possible for a suburbanite to return frequently to the city to socialize with his old *piasani* and thereby reinforce social and political predispositions and behavior patterns formed while he was still a resident of an ethnic enclave. Obviously, telephone conversations can be even more frequent.

That ethnic enclaves in the city are now accepting such ties with suburbanites can be seen in the work of Gans (1962: Chap. 10). While first and second generation Italians rejected individuals moving into the middle-class world of suburbia and made social contact with them difficult and unpleasant, Gans found that social mobility is now a much more acceptable form of behavior. In the past, the socially mobile individual had to renounce his ties with his old peer group society and the movement to a new social class was a traumatic event. As a result, most mobility in the urban village was internal to the village, *i.e.*, people retained their ties to their community while improving their position within it. Any ethnic in the suburbs would necessarily be someone who had severed ties with his ethnic background. Thus the behavior of white ethnics in the suburbs should have been quite different from the behavior of ethnics remaining in the city. However, Gans' description of the evolution of peer group society supports Parenti's argument; if the upwardly mobile individual is no

longer required to renounce his peer group society (and vice versa), then suburbanization need no longer lead to the dilution of ethnic identification as a determinant of political and social behavior.

Two other categories of size of place of residence, less often discussed in the recent literature on ethnicity and politics, will also be controlled for: "other urban" and rural residence (both as defined by the Comparative State Elections Project, as were the previous two categories).[6] While most of the literature on ethnicity and politics concentrates on the central city, there is reason to believe that within these less densely populated areas the ability of ethnic groups to structure attitudes and behavior may be greatest (see, for example, Lubell, 1965; Bean, 1948). The effects of ethnicity in all four categories of size of place of residence will be examined below.

VII. EDUCATION AS A CONTROL VARIABLE

Controlling for level of education is obviously important. As already noted, social class has often been perceived to be a crucial factor in structuring ethnic politics. In particular, it is frequently argued that lower-class individuals are the most affected by their ethnic identification. This being the case, it is necessary to control for social class.

Education has been chosen as the appropriate control variable for social class; we will elaborate several reasons for this choice. First, education is highly correlated with income and occupation, two variables often used as indicators of social class. In addition, and more importantly for our purposes, increased levels of education would seem to be more intimately connected with exposure to non-ethnically defined social stimuli. Thus while many grade schools are ethnically homogeneous, and even more were in the past, as an individual moves to the higher grades (and larger schools), the possibilities for ethnically homogeneous schools decrease. The most abrupt change must occur at the level of college education, where, except for schools catering to specific racial or religious denominations, ethnic backgrounds are usually ignored. Accordingly, in our use of education as a control variable, we have dichotomized our sample into two education groups--those individuals who have not had any college education (those who have completed twelve years of schooling or less) and those individuals with additional schooling beyond high school.

VIII. INSTITUTING CONTROLS AND THE NEED FOR SUMMARY STATISTICS

We can now return to the national sample and institute the sets of controls discussed above. We would expect that the effects of ethnicity in any particular control category would be greater than in the nation as a whole. However, once we institute our controls, the analysis of ethnicity and politics becomes extremely complex. We now have eight categories in which to explore the effects of ethnicity (four categories for size of place times two categories for education). If we utilize the mode of analysis previously employed, relying on mean scores on attitudinal measures and percentages of partisan behavior to document ethnic differences, the task would be unmanageable. Some shorthand method of describing the effects of ethnicity on political behavior is needed. We turn, therefore, to the following methodology.

Essentially, three measures will be used to summarize the data. The first measure has been introduced previously in Table 3-6. This is the chi square statistic, Cramer's V. This measure has a range from 0.0 to +1.0, with higher coefficients indicating stronger relationships between the two variables. This measure will be used to indicate the relationship between each of our four models of ethnicity and the three partisan variables of party identification, presidential choice in 1968, and congressional choice in 1968. By comparing the V statistics for each form of ethnicity and partisanship, it will be possible to identify that form of ethnicity most closely related to (has higher V coefficients with) partisan behavior.

Because these measures of partisan behavior are nominal variables, we have relied on a chi square statistic as a measure of the strength of relationship. While certainly valid and, as we shall see, indicative of interesting patterns of ethnic partisan behavior, the comparison between the four forms of ethnicity using this statistic is somewhat cumbersome. However, our attitudinal variables are unquestionably continuous variables. Using these attitudinal measures as dependent variables allows us to generate two statistics which lead to a succinct method for the assessment of both the total impact of all four dimensions of ethnicity on issue attitudes, as well as an easy comparison of the relative importance of each of these four different forms of ethnic identification.

The two statistics used are based on analysis of variance (ANOVA) techniques derived from the General Linear Model

(see for example, Bottenberg and Ward, 1963). Individual ethnic identification across all four models of ethnic identification is treated as a "dummy" variable (or "binary vectors") where each respondent is given a score of "0" or "1" depending on his ethnic identification. Thus, a "1" is assigned to an individual for a particular ethnic group membership, a "0" for non-membership. An individual might have a "1" for being white, a "1" for being Catholic, a "1" for being Italian, and a "1" for being a new ethnic. This same individual would be given "0's" in the vectors representing other racial, religious, and nationality groups. An analysis of variance is then conducted for this "full model" of ethnic identification. The obvious result of this full model is that the amount of variance explained by ethnicity in each attitudinal scale is maximized (and, of course, the error sum of squares is minimized).

It is well known that ANOVA is adjusted for different numbers of categories in explanatory models. Rutherford (1971) shows Cramer's V is similarly stable across different size contingency tables. This means that the reported coefficients can be compared across the different models developed in this analysis. Thus, the relationship between, *e.g.*, the religious model and our partisan variables can be compared to the relationship between the nationality model and partisanship, even though the tables upon which the coefficients are based vary in size.

It is also known that ANOVA is stable across different size samples. While V is somewhat more affected by frequency distribution than ANOVA statistics, it too is adjusted for sample size (Loether and McTavish, 1974). This property makes possible the comparison of the relationship between the different models of ethnicity and political behavior and attitudes as measured in the different size samples utilized in this analysis.

Our first statistic based on ANOVA techniques, r^2, is a measure of the amount of variance explained by this full model of ethnicity; *i.e.*, the combined (additive) explanatory impact of all forms of ethnic identification. A similar analysis of variance is conducted for each of the four separate forms of ethnic identification. By comparing the error sums of squares of each of these four "restricted" models of ethnic identification, we can, after taking into account the numbers of categories in each model (adjusting for degrees of freedom), compute an F-ratio indicating the relative efficiency of each of the four "restricted" models of ethnic identification. The

smaller the F-ratio, the more important (or efficient) the restricted model in explaining the variance in attitudinal data becomes. This second statistic, the F-ratio, provides a powerful and direct test of the relative importance of each form of ethnicity.

Given this, we can now institute controls for size of place of residence and for level of education and examine the importance of ethnicity for distinct subpopulations of the nation.

IX. ETHNIC POLITICS AND DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROLS

Instituting controls for class (as measured by education) and place of residence creates some intriguing patterns. First, it becomes apparent that the institution of controls is extremely important in the study of white ethnicity. The introduction of controls accentuates some patterns already evident in the uncontrolled national sample. It will be recalled that across the nation as a whole, religion and nationality were the forms of white ethnicity most strongly related to partisan behavior (Table 3-6) and attitudes (Table 3-5). Once controls are instituted, the strength of the relationships of these two forms of ethnicity and partisanship increases substantially in almost every control group when compared to the entire national sample (Tables 3-8 and 3-9). Note, too, that old/new ethnicity, the form least strongly associated with political behavior and attitudes in the national sample, becomes even less important. Not only is the impact of ethnicity on partisanship clarified, but the amount of variance in attitudes explained by ethnicity also increases dramatically over that explained in the uncontrolled national sample (see Table 3-10).

Given the existing literature documenting the importance of these controls when examining ethnic group behavior and the fact that once we institute controls the effects of white ethnicity on political behavior and attitudes become greater (while the impact on race is minimal), we will deal primarily with controlled samples for the remainder of our analysis.

However, while the relationships between the two major forms of white ethnicity and partisanship tend to be higher in each of the control groups than in the nation as a whole, as would be predicted by the literature, the differences between control groups do not necessarily conform to expectations.

Most obviously, there is no uniform fall off in the impact of ethnicity on partisanship in areas outside of the central cities. Indeed, for both religious identification and especially for nationality identification, there are often stronger relationships between ethnicity and partisanship in the non-city areas. For example, in Table 3-8 we see that the strength of relationship between presidential choice and national identification for lower-class central city residents is .23 while that for lower-class other urban residents is .30. Similarly, the relationship between religious identification and presidential choice is stronger for lower-class other urban and rural residents than it is for lower-class central city residents. Thus, it cannot be said that in the nation as a whole the effects of ethnicity on partisan behavior are strongest in the central cities.

The effects of ethnicity on issue attitudes as measured by the three issue scales that we have constructed also vary from control group to control group, but again, not necessarily in conformity with expected patterns (Table 3-10). There are clear differences in the impact of ethnicity upon the scales. This is most notable when comparing the social issue and the question of Vietnam. The amount of variance explained (r^2) in social issue attitudes most closely fits the expected patterns (see Table 3-10). On this scale, the amount of variance explained by ethnicity is highest among lower-class central city residents. Moreover, there is a general tendency for the explanatory effects of ethnicity to decrease with higher levels of education and with movement away from the central cities. It is, of course, this "social issue" that most closely resembles "traditional" issues of ethnic politics, such as ethnic succession or the integration of new ethnic groups into society. Therefore, it is not surprising that this issue evokes most closely the expected response pattern.

However, attitudes on the war in Vietnam less closely fit the expected pattern. This issue evoked more diverse responses among upper-class ethnic groups than among lower-class ones. Ethnicity had its greatest explanatory impact on upper-class urban fringe residents. It would appear that the war in Vietnam was a different kind of issue than the "social issue" and was not necessarily important in differentiating the responses of lower-class ethnic groups.

TABLE 3-8

STRENGTH OF RELATIONSHIP (CRAMER'S V) BETWEEN PARTISAN VARIABLES AND FOUR MODELS OF ETHNICITY, CONTROLLING FOR SOCIAL CLASS AND SIZE OF PLACE OF RESIDENCE

Lower Class

Central City

	Party I.D.	*N*	Presidential Choice	*N*	Congressional Choice	*N*
Race	.20	1761	.25	1314	.26	1217
Religion	.15	1261	.18	996	.16	949
Nationality	.21	1123	.23	927	.21	883
Old/New	*	1152	*	935	*	891

Urban Fringe

	Party I.D.	*N*	Presidential Choice	*N*	Congressional Choice	*N*
Race	*	975	.15	793	.22	740
Religion	.18	894	.13	724	.22	685
Nationality	.25	819	.22	650	.25	606
Old/New	*	836	.15	666	*	622

Other Urban

	Party I.D.	*N*	Presidential Choice	*N*	Congressional Choice	*N*
Race	.15	868	.23	636	.17	584
Religion	.18	737	.25	546	.17	509
Nationality	.23	662	.30	496	.33	467
Old/New	*	676	*	504	*	475

Rural

	Party I.D.	*N*	Presidential Choice	*N*	Congressional Choice	*N*
Race	.18	1636	.27	1283	.21	1211
Religion	.16	1440	.23	1153	.11	1108
Nationality	.17	1237	.17	983	.25	952
Old/New	*	1252	*	997	.12	966

*Not statistically significant at .001 level.

TABLE 3-9

STRENGTH OF RELATIONSHIP (CRAMER'S V) BETWEEN PARTISAN VARIABLES AND FOUR MODELS OF ETHNICITY, CONTROLLING FOR SOCIAL CLASS AND SIZE OF PLACE OF RESIDENCE

Upper Class

Central City

	Party I.D.	N	Presidential Choice	N	Congressional Choice	N
Race	.17	662	.17	602	*	564
Religion	.18	549	.24	510	.18	474
Nationality	.29	543	.29	499	*	477
Old/New	*	554	*	509	*	487

Urban Fringe

	Party I.D.	N	Presidential Choice	N	Congressional Choice	N
Race	*	551	*	516	*	482
Religion	.21	501	.28	472	.31	445
Nationality	.22	492	.28	461	.28	433
Old/New	*	502	*	471	.17	443

Other Urban

	Party I.D.	N	Presidential Choice	N	Congressional Choice	N
Race	.33	303	.28	279	*	255
Religion	.19	274	*	256	*	232
Nationality	.32	255	*	236	*	215
Old/New	*	257	*	237	*	216

Rural

	Party I.D.	N	Presidential Choice	N	Congressional Choice	N
Race	.20	435	.31	408	.19	393
Religion	*	412	.19	386	*	374
Nationality	.29	369	.28	351	.30	338
Old/New	*	382	*	364	*	351

*Not statistically significant at .001 level.

TABLE 3-10

ATTITUDINAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CONTROLLED SUB-POPULATIONS OF ETHNIC GROUPS (r^2 AND F-RATIOS)

Central City

	Lower Class			Upper Class		
	Social Issue	Economic Issues	Vietnam Stand	Social Issue	Economic Issues	Vietnam Stand
r^2(%)	38	6	9	18	13	12
F-Ratio:						
Race	17.2	4.1	13.0	7.1	*	*
Religion	17.4	4.7	8.9	3.2	3.1	3.8
Nationality	124.1	7.3	25.4	11.5	3.9	6.4
Old/New	62.2	12.4	*	*	*	*

Urban Fringe

	Lower Class			Upper Class		
	Social Issue	Economic Issues	Vietnam Stand	Social Issue	Economic Issues	Vietnam Stand
r^2(%)	9	10	5	13	8	14
F-Ratio:						
Race	1.6	3.6	*	*	*	*
Religion	3.9	8.1	7.7	2.8	2.0	4.1
Nationality	*	10.0	*	6.5	*	9.9
Old/New	*	8.1	*	*	*	*

Other Urban

	Lower Class			Upper Class		
	Social Issue	Economic Issues	Vietnam Stand	Social Issue	Economic Issues	Vietnam Stand
r^2(%)	16	8	3	NS	17	NS
F-Ratio:						
Race	5.8	1.6	*		50.0	
Religion	5.2	2.8	*		2.0	
Nationality	*	*	*		17.8	
Old/New	*	*	*		*	

TABLE 3-10 (Continued)

Rural

	Lower Class			Upper Class		
	Social Issue	Economic Issues	Vietnam Stand	Social Issue	Economic Issues	Vietnam Stand
r^2(%)	17	9	1	9	7	10
F-Ratio:						
Race	5.6	3.8	*	1.8	2.0	*
Religion	10.1	5.3	*	*	*	2.8
Nationality	35.9	17.0	*	2.7	*	4.6
Old/New	*	*	*	*	*	*

Note: NS indicates that no significant effect was found in all of the four models together and * signifies that a particular model had no statistical impact at the .001 level.

X. THE MOBILIZATION OF ETHNIC PARTISAN DIFFERENCES

Perhaps the most interesting pattern of all concerns the differences in the strength of relationship between ethnicity and party identification on the one hand, and ethnicity and candidate choice on the other. It will be recalled that party identification has frequently been characterized as a long-term psychological commitment that defines "normal" voting propensities (Converse, 1966). Moreover, party identification has historical roots and is of remarkable durability. The encompassing, non-ideological bases of American political parties have allowed historical affiliations to persist in the face of changing circumstances. This undoubtedly has had a weakening effect on the relationship between ethnic identification and party identification. For example, in many of the nation's cities both lower-class white ethnics and blacks--groups that are in many ways in direct conflict with one another--have historical Democratic Party attachments reaching back to the 1930s. Similarly, in the rural South, both whites and blacks may call themselves Democrats (perhaps for totally different reasons). This would obviously weaken the relationship between party and race. A similar process may take place for white

religious groups and party identification. Combining the North where the Democratic Party has low support from white Protestants with the South would weaken the relationship between this form of ethnicity and party identification.

Thus it is apparent that history has had an effect in reducing the connection between ethnicity and party identification and in obscuring ethnic political differences. However, inspection of the data makes it evident that across controlled subpopulations, the short-term forces associated with the 1968 election acted to increase the political importance of ethnic identification.

This intensification of partisan differences can be most clearly seen in the behavior of lower-class racial groups (see Table 3-8). For lower-class individuals in central cities, race has a small relationship with party identification (.20). For the other categories of size of place of residence, the relationship between race and party identification of lower-class respondents is similarly weak: In one instance there is no significant relationship at all (urban fringe), and the relationship is below .20 in the "other urban" and rural areas. Yet when presented with the choice between the 1968 candidates, racial groups acted in more distinct manners. Thus the V statistic increases markedly in each category of size of place of residence. For example, in the central cities, the V statistic increases from .20 for party identification to .25 for presidential choice.[7] Similar increases in the strength of the relationship between race and partisan behavior can be found in each category of size of place of residence, and for both presidential and congressional choice. Obviously, the 1968 election increased important political differences between racial groups, differences that are less evident in party identification.

The nature of the differences between racial groups can be further explored by excluding from the analysis all racial groups other than whites and blacks, data not presented here in detail. While the party identification statistic does not change, racial differences in voting increase markedly for presidential choice and, in several instances, for congressional choice. For example, in the central cities, the V statistic for all lower-class racial groups and presidential choices is .25, but is .34 for blacks and whites only. Similar results occur in the other three categories of size of place. Hence, the short-term forces of the 1968 election acted in clear and distinct ways to mobilize lower-class racial differences and,

in particular, differences between blacks and whites. These findings provide strong evidence that racial ethnicity, especially among lower-class individuals, was important in 1968.

When we examine the two most important forms of white ethnic identification across control categories, it can be seen that the voting choices made by whites in 1968, as far as they can be characterized in ethnic terms, manifested themselves more in terms of nationality group identification than religious identification. Looking first at party identification, one can see that across control populations, neither form of white ethnicity was much more strongly related to that form of partisanship. While in general, nationality identification tends to be more closely associated with party identification, there are several cases in which religious identification was as closely related. However, in terms of actual voting decisions, nationality identification is consistently more strongly related to *both* the presidential and congressional vote in almost every control category, especially for lower-class respondents. Furthermore, just as lower-class blacks and whites reacted to the short-term influences on the 1968 election in ways that sharpened the political differences between them (as seen in higher V coefficients for candidate choice than for party identification), in most instances the same pattern can be found in the nationality model, although not as strongly evident among whites as between whites and blacks.

In general, the effect of nationality identification was heightened during the 1968 election, and that form of ethnic identification was more closely related to actual voting choices for President and Congress than it was to party identification. Note a similar heightening of the effects of religious identification on actual voting choices compared to party identification. Thus, three of the four forms of ethnicity which we have identified responded to the short-term forces of the 1968 election and showed increased importance for actual partisan voting behavior over long-term party commitments. Given the overall stronger relationships between race and nationality with voting behavior as compared to the effects of religious identification, the first two forms of ethnicity are seen as the forms of ethnic identification most closely associated with actual candidate choice in 1968.

We have referred to the short-term forces that produced the actual voting patterns for candidates in 1968. Considerable evidence exists to indicate that the strongest short-term

forces operating in the 1968 election were issue attitudes (Kovenock, Beardsley, and Prothro, 1970; Burnham, 1970; Pomper, 1972). We have seen that voting differences became more pronounced between racial, nationality, and religious groups compared to the long-term identification of individuals in these groups to political parties. We are interested then in seeing the extent to which the heightened importance of these forms of ethnicity in voting choices are paralleled by the role of ethnic identification in explaining crucial issue differences that may have actually affected voting choices. Data relating ethnicity's impact on issue attitudes as measured by our three issue scales provide a direct means of investigating this question.

XI. ETHNICITY AND ISSUE ATTITUDES

An inspection of the amount of attitudinal variation explained by the full model of ethnic identification indicates that while controls have improved the explanatory capabilities of ethnicity, the relationship is still not overwhelmingly strong (Table 3-10). Not surprisingly, ethnicity of lower-class individuals is more important in explaining variation in attitudes toward the social issue than in explaining variation in the other two issue scales. For upper-class respondents, ethnicity has about an equal impact on social issue attitudes and attitudes toward invading North Vietnam.

As indicated above, within the total amount of variance explained by the full model of ethnicity, the F-ratios indicate which of the four "restricted" models is most important. We have seen that once controls were instituted, nationality group identification and racial group membership were the forms of ethnic identification most important with regard to voting choices in 1968. We have hypothesized that these two forms of ethnicity should also be most closely tied to issue positions (their F-ratios should be smallest). Inspection of the F-ratios in Table 3-10 does indicate that in most instances, the racial model of ethnicity is in fact the most important restricted model. Indeed, for the lower class, race is the most important form of ethnic identification in explaining variation in social and economic issues in every category of residence. Hence, partisan differences between racial groups parallel issue attitudinal differences between racial groups.

When we inspect the F-ratios for the two most important forms of white ethnicity, nationality and religion, we are

presented with the curious fact that in every single control category, and for all three issue scales, the F-ratios for the religious model are *smaller* than those for the nationality model. This means that issue variation was more fully explained by religious group identification than by nationality identification. Yet of these two forms of white ethnicity, there can be no doubt that white nationality group identification and membership was the focal point of most interest in 1968. Furthermore, once controls were instituted, we found that nationality identification was in fact more closely tied to voting patterns than was religious identification. Yet differences in issue attitudes appear to have been more pronounced among religious groups than among nationality groups. Thus, while issue differences parallel and help explain racial voting patterns of 1968, the pattern for white ethnicity is different. As a result, the importance of nationality group identification does not appear to be built on equally important differences in issue attitudes between these groups. Thus, we must look elsewhere to explain the increased role of nationality identification in the 1968 election.

XII. THE ORIGIN OF NATIONALITY GROUP DIFFERENCES: SOME OBSERVATIONS

We have looked at two sets of data, neither of which satisfactorily explains the concern for nationality identification in the late 1960s. In the uncontrolled national sample, white nationality identification was less important than religious identification in explaining either issue variation or partisan behavior. Once we instituted demographic controls to identify more clearly variations in the importance of ethnicity, we found that nationality identification was more closely linked to partisan behavior than was religious identification. We also found that nationality partisan differences were accentuated by the short-term forces of the 1968 election as were religious differences. Yet, nationality explained less variation in issue attitudes than did religious identification. Issue attitude differences, differences that many proclaimed to be the most important short-term force of the 1968 election, cannot be used to explain increased partisan differences between between nationality groups, as they can to explain differences between racial groups or between religious groups. Thus we still do not know the reason for the general concern for nationality-based politics, nor the reason for its apparent importance in partisan behavior in the 1968 election.

Two related factors may help resolve this complex situation and help to identify the reason for the concern for nationality group politics. First, it is possible that distinct regional variations in the impact of ethnicity produced the above patterns and that in certain regions of the country, nationality identification was as important in defining attitudes as it was in defining the vote. Aggregation into a national sample, even if controls are instituted for class and size of place of residence, may obscure important regional variations. Region has often been used as a control variable in studies of ethnicity and regional variations in ethnic behavior demonstrated (Wolfinger and Field, 1966; Lineberry and Fowler, 1967). It has been shown elsewhere that the relevance of each of these models of ethnicity differs between several of the states included in the CSEP (Schneider, 1976). That analysis showed that the particular form of white ethnicity found to prevail in an area was heavily dependent on the degree of new ethnic migration. Central cities in New York and Massachusetts, areas overwhelmingly affected by heavy Catholic new ethnic migration of the 1880-1910 period, showed ethnic political behavior predominantly characterized by nationality group differences. In other areas of the states sampled, areas exposed to new ethnic migration that was not as extensive as in the central cities of Massachusetts or New York, religious differentiation was found to prevail. And, in the areas with the least exposure to in-migration of new ethnics, the old/new distinction was found to prevail. Thus, it was proposed that the "density" of new ethnic migration conditioned the form of ethnicity found by creating different potentials for coalition behavior based on the size of the Catholic population. Specifically, it was argued that only in the areas with the greatest Catholic population concentration was the opportunity for nationality group differences consistently presented. Thus, while we are describing and analyzing ethnic political differences on the national level, controls for region and subsequent analysis of ethnic behavior in smaller subsets of the nation may be useful. However, ways of defining such relevant regional subsets for the study of ethnic politics are not well developed (see Elazar, 1970; Sharkansky, 1970; Schneider, forthcoming). For the effects of ethnic behavior on politics in a variety of states, the reader is referred to the voluminous body of literature on state politics.

Let us advance also a second possible explanation for the incongruities we have seen. In our introductory chapter, we argued that the appearance of renewed nationality group politics in the 1960s was somehow "illogical," given certain

undeniable social conditions--social mobility, lack of continuing European in-migrations of large size. However, it was suggested that this "illogical" phenomenon could best be understood as a movement protesting the demands of the black civil rights movement and other disruptions of the 1960s. It is possible that these disruptions *by themselves* were not sufficient to affect strongly the lives of most individuals and did not translate themselves spontaneously into political motivations (Burnham, 1970:171). It is more likely that these latent discontents to become effective had to be articulated by such societal agents as the media, intellectuals, or an emerging intra-white ethnic group leadership. These forces interacting with one another may have manipulated the symbols of the politics of the 1960s in such a way as to increase societal awareness of nationality group differences. In this process, quite minimal issue differences may have been exaggerated and produced a greater political significance for nationality group identification than was warranted by actual relationships to issue attitude differences. Hence while issues as short-term forces may have had a direct impact on racially defined voting, other forces may have intervened to produce the heightened importance of nationality defined partisanship that we found in 1968.

To reiterate: Racial membership and nationality group identification were important in 1968 with regard to certain politically significant variables of party and voting behavior. However, racial differences in voting behavior were more clearly built upon strong attitudinal differences. As stated in Chapter 1, nationality group politics in 1968 can be seen as a temporary response to certain conditions in the late 1960s. This response was superficial on one level in that it was not characterized by strong attitudinal differences among nationality groups. Yet the visibility of nationality groups and of their leaders, coupled with a high level of media interest, may have heightened public awareness of nationality groups and led to the assumption that in fact issue differences existed. One could compare the strategies of nationality group leaders and the media response to them to the organizing attempts of poor blacks which, in the nature of American politics, put a premium on militancy and exaggeration of issue positions (see Lipsky, 1970). This assumption of differences created in turn a pattern of heightened importance of inter-nationality group differences in 1968. This line of argument would help to explain why in 1968 the nationality group model was "best" for the party political variables while hardly important in defining issue positions.

Finally, it is possible that the two factors of region and of nationality group identification as protest activity intertwine in an important way. Nationality identification as a meaningful form of social organization is not a phenomenon that one finds spread throughout the nation. Some areas of the United States do not possess significant populations with recent European backgrounds. In these areas we can hardly expect nationality identification to be important. But there are other regions with large populations of varied nationality backgrounds and the potential for (and history of) nationality politics. Many of the states in these regions are large, wealthy, and occupy crucial positions in the information network of the United States. This is particularly true of the northeastern sections of the country. Many of these same states have experienced significant black immigration into their urban areas in the past forty years, producing the population mixture that we have associated with the renaissance of nationality identification as protest movement. Given the media concentration in these areas, any incipient protest movement would tend to attract inordinate amounts of publicity, further encouraging protest activity in the areas. Since so much of the media's coverage of these events is nationwide, it could very well have affected the rest of the country's awareness of white nationality group identification as a political strategy. Thus minimal attitudinal differences between nationality groups may have become exaggerated in the nation as a whole, even though larger differences may have existed in specific areas, and were translated into voting behavior.

We know that New York, sitting atop the national web of ness media, does at times "export" local concerns across the nation (see Epstein, 1973) and that the media can affect the perception of political events and ideas (Lang and Lang, 1968: 305; Robinson, 1976). We also know that New York during the late 1960s was the site of intense nationality group political activity. It may be that the news media seeing the intensity of this novel political conflict in their own backyard gave it extensive national coverage and thereby sensitized the entire country to nationality-based politics while in reality this political phenomenon was peculiar to the cities of the northeast. This would explain why the vigor with which we assumed nationality politics were being acted out in the nation in the late 1960s is not reflected fully in the data more accurately measuring the ethnic divisions of the national population: nationality differences are not relevant to the majority of people in most regions of the United States. This argument is highly speculative and beyond the scope of the data on which this analysis is based.

CHAPTER 4

Conclusion

The major argument, indeed the basic underlying theme that has given form to this investigation, is that ethnicity is a multidimensional concept of social identification. While at present most people would tend to equate the term ethnicity (at least when applied to whites) with nationality identification, we have argued that the concept of ethnicity has in fact a much broader meaning encompassing at least four distinct dimensions: nationality identification, religious identification, old vs. new ethnic stock, and racial membership. If at the current time we stress the nationality dimension of ethnicity, at other times in our cultural history the other dimensions of ethnicity have received wide attention. Indeed, even at the present time, substantial variation in the relative importance attached to the various dimensions exists between geographic areas of the Unites States (Schneider, 1976, forthcoming; Wolfinger, 1965; Lineberry and Fowler, 1967). This multidimensional aspect of ethnicity must be recognized in any future discussion of the concept of ethnicity as well as in any research on the role of ethnicity in politics.

In the national sample analyzed, several interesting patterns of ethnic differentiation emerged. First, we found that none of the dimensions of ethnicity were very strongly related to political behavior. In general, religious identification had comparatively the strongest and most consistent impact on the partisan behavior and the issue attitudes of whites. It was then argued that these generally weak relationships might be strengthened once controls for education ("class") and size of place of residence, controls essential to the analysis of ethnic political behavior, were instituted.

Once these relevant controls were introduced on the national sample some patterns of note did emerge. The impact of ethnicity on the political behavior of individuals in each of our control categories did increase over that found in the national sample as a whole. This would conform to predictions based on the literature on ethnic politics (see Chapter III). However, in contradiction to these expectations, there was no

uniform decrease in the importance of ethnicity on the behavior of individuals with higher education ("upper class") or individuals outside the central cities. This calls into question some basic assumptions embodied in the literature on ethnic politics.

Even more intriguing, however, was the emergence of what appears to be a "false" ethnic political consciousness on the part of whites. It will be recalled that there is a substantial consensus among political analysts that 1968 was an election year marked by a high degree of voting based on issue positions and issue attitudes. We would, therefore, expect that ethnic groups differentiated by issue positions would also be differentiated in their partisan behavior. This, in fact, was the case for racial ethnic groups; differences in issue position between whites and non-whites appear to have paralleled differences in partisan behavior. Among whites, however, the major attitudinal issue differences lay between religious groups. Yet the major partisan differences across the subpopulations of the national sample were not between religious groups but between nationality groups. Thus, the partisan differences between nationality groups in the control categories of the national sample do not appear to be explicable by issue differences. The source of the importance of nationality groups in structuring partisan behavior must be sought elsewhere than in issue attitudinal differences, perhaps, as suggested in Chapter III in the structure of the national media and the "exporting" of cultural phenomena from New York City.

Third, the analysis of the national sample alerts us to interesting patterns of ethnic differentiation, but it still leaves many issues unresolved and may in fact mask issues germane to the adequate study of ethnic politics. In particular, focusing on a national sample alone inevitably obscures variations in the importance of ethnic politics between regions in the country. For example, southern politics is still often concerned with the Bible, sin, and the religious fervor of a candidate. Nationality group differences are not important given the relative homogeneity of the white southern population but the kind of Baptist a politician is may be a deciding factor. On the other hand, for a northern politician to talk about "Eye-talians," as Jimmy Carter did when accepting the Presidential nomination in 1976, would be suicidal, and knowledge about the proper way to eat bagels, cannolli, or kielbasa is essential for survival in the ethnic melange of the northeast. These "cultural" differences so evident in cuisine,

church life, and settlement patterns also affect the basis of politics in different parts of the country. A national level analysis may conceal such differences, and subsectioning the nation into smaller regions may in the long run be the most productive strategy for further study of ethnic politics.

Notes

Chapter I

1. The "end of ideology" school of thought predominated during this period; see Daniel Bell, 1960.

2. See Sundquist, 1969; Marris and Rein, 1967; and Rein, 1970 for a more complete description of these changes in the implementation of the program, and the effects that these changes had on the program.

3. The major component of the accommodation model as postulated by Litt is the *gradual* accommodation of new ethnic groups into the political process. Each ethnic group patiently awaits its turn to gain political recognition (in particular through inclusion on a "balanced" ticket) and other political power in the existing political machinery. Mass participation, noncompromising demands by ethnic groups, and the ideology of ethnic group separatism run directly counter to the very workings of the accommodation style that has characterized white ethnic politics.

Chapter II

1. The Comparative State Elections Project, directed by James W. Prothro and administered through the Institute for Research in Social Science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, generated 7,673 interviews conducted in a six-week period following the 1968 election. A unique sampling design accompanied this very large number of interviews, providing independent samples of approximately 500 interviews in 13 states. Project director was David M. Kovenock; interviews were conducted by Louis Harris and Associates. The full data set, containing responses to the nearly 500 questions asked, together with indexes and summarized answers, can be obtained from the Social Science Data Library of the Institute. A detailed description of the project and its methodology will be found in: David M. Kovenock, James W. Prothro, and Associates, *Explaining the Vote: Presidential Choices in the Nation and the States, 1968* (Chapel Hill: Institute for Research in Social Science, University of North Carolina, Parts I and II, 1973). Summaries of some of the major tabulations by state and region will be found in: Merle Black, David M. Kovenock, and William C. Reynolds, *Political Attitudes in the Nation and the States* (Chapel Hill: Institute for Research in Social Science, University of North Carolina, 1974).

(Notes accompanying Chapter II, continued)

2. Data from the Comparative State Election Project's 1968 surveys generalize Lenski's findings to the nation as a whole. When asked, "What is your religion, if any?", only 3% of the CSEP respondents failed to identify with a religious group. But when asked, "Aside from being an American, what *one* nationality do you mainly consider yourself to be?", 10% were unable to supply a nationality identification, and another 13% specified "just American," "100% American."

Chapter III

1. While party identification is most often conceived of as an ordinal measure and has sometimes been "pushed" to interval level, we are treating it here as a nominal level measure. This treatment is for balance of presentation. That is, we wish to subject all three partisan variables to similar analysis, and the two partisan variables measuring actual voting choice are usually exclusively conceptualized as nominal measures. The major conceptual argument for using the threefold schema of party identification employed here rather than creating an ordinal or interval scale lies in assigning the category of Independents to be coequal with Democrats and Republicans rather than a stage between them. This coequal treatment of Independents is supported by several works that show the behavior of Independents is in fact different from that of party identifiers, making the concept of a unidimensional party identification scale questionable (see Strang, 1976; Key, 1966).

2. The attitude solicited by an item was measured through the "card-sort" technique. The item, worded as indicated, was printed on a small card. The respondent was instructed to read the card and then to "place it in one of the seven boxes [on the card-sort board] that best describes how strongly you agree or disagree with the statement" printed on the card. The sort board, which was placed in front of the respondent, consisted of a strip of heavy paper roughly 36 inches wide and six inches high on which was printed a row of seven boxes labeled from left to right, "strongly disagree," "disagree," "slightly disagree," "not sure," "slightly agree," "agree," and "strongly agree." In explaining the sort board to respondents, the interviewers encouraged the use of the "not sure" category whenever respondents were unsure of their views on an item. (If for any reason the respondent was unable to read the card, the interviewer read the statement on the card to the respondent and

(Notes accompanying Chapter III, continued)

orally solicited the degree of his agreement or disagreement with the statement.) In the course of each CSEP interview, responses to a total of 140 attitudinal items were obtained in this fashion.

3. These items are derived from CSEP variables 367, 271, 273, 354, and 311, respectively.

4. These items are derived from CSEP variables 323, 335, 343, 347, and 352, respectively.

5. These two items were CSEP variables 356 and 353, respectively.

6. The size-of-place classification as defined by CSEP is that utilized in 1968 by Louis Harris and Associates for the purpose of drawing and stratifying samples. Briefly stated, "central city" populations include those persons living in a city of 50,000 or more (or in integrated, "twin" cities whose populations total at least 50,000 by the 1960 U.S. census count. The "urban fringe" includes the populations in the closely settled areas contiguous to central cities but not included in them. The central cities and the urban fringes together make up what the census calls "urbanized areas." The "other urban" population includes all persons living in communities of 2,500 or more inhabitants outside of urbanized areas. "Rural" residents are those living in places of less than 2,500 people which lie outside of urbanized areas. (For more complete definitions of the four size-of-place categories and of the concept of "urbanized areas," see U.S. Bureau of the Census, *U.S. Census of Population: 1960*; Volume 1, *Characteristics of the Population*, Part 1, United States Summary [Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964], pp. XXIX-XXXVII.)

7. Since the distribution of respondents across racial categories for the two variables is virtually identical, the increase in the V coefficient indicates an absolute increase in the strength of the relationship. This holds true for all comparisons presented "within" models for a given population.

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Published by the Institute for Research in Social Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

Technical Editor: Peggy Johnston Quinn
Camera Ready Copy: Donald Eggert

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